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ABSTRACT 
The work in high-risk environments like an operating room is complex. The 
operating team consist of many professions with different tasks cooperating 
towards a common goal, the performance of safe surgery. The operating teams’ 
technical and non-technical skills may affect the surgical outcome. The aim of this 
thesis was to explore some of the factors that may influence safe surgery. 
Study I evaluated the operating team’s perceptions of an implemented 
intraoperative pause routine. The operating team felt positive about the 
implementation, many perceived that communication and teamwork was 
enhanced and some of the surgeons stated that a pause made them feel refreshed 
and sometimes contributed to changes of surgical strategy.  
Study II was an interventional study to evaluate teamwork and safety climate in 
the operating room after an intervention with education on safety climate and 
teamwork, and the introduction of a revised WHO Surgical Safety Checklist. We 
found deficiencies in communication and teamwork in the operating team. The 
intervention did not change teamwork or safety climate.  
Study III evaluated surgeons’ self-assessed satisfaction with the performance of 
prostatectomies in a large clinical trial. There was a strong correlation between 
surgeons’ satisfaction and intraoperative difficulties or complications, which 
became stronger with every additional difficulty or complication. 
Study IV was a randomized controlled trial to assess if surgeons’ stress levels 
were affected by an intraoperative pause during simulated operations. There were 
no significant differences in stress levels but the surgeons’ perception of the 
intraoperative pause was positive.   
In conclusion, to study non-technical skills in the operating team is complex as 
surgical outcome and patient safety are multi-factorial. Many among the operating 
team members believed that improved teamwork and communication could 
benefit patient safety. Thus, one way to enhance patient safety could be to 
introduce intraoperative pauses as they were perceived to be beneficial for 
teamwork and communication. 
Keywords: operating room, non-technical skills, teamwork, intraoperative stress 
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SAMMANFATTNING PÅ SVENSKA 
Bakgrund 
Arbetet inom högriskorganisationer som operationssalen är komplext. 
Operationsteamet är ett dynamiskt team där olika professioner, med olika 
utbildning och olika arbetsuppgifter arbetar tillsammans mot ett gemensamt 
slutmål, utförandet av säker kirurgi. Då flera olika professioner arbetar 
tillsammans är det viktigt att teamarbetet har en tydlig struktur och att man inom 
teamet har respekt för varandras professioner. Operationsteamets såväl tekniska 
som icke-tekniska färdigheter (kommunikation, teamarbete, ledarskap, situations-
medvetenhet, beslutsfattande, hantering av stress respektive trötthet) kan påverka 
det kirurgiska resultatet och på så sätt även patientsäkerheten.  
Syfte  
Ett övergripande syfte med avhandlingen var att studera vissa icke-tekniska 
färdigheter och andra faktorer i operationssalen som kan påverka patientsäkerhet 
i samband med kirurgi.  
Studie I utfördes med syftet att utvärdera operationsteamets erfarenheter av 
implementeringen av en pausrutin under långa operationer. Pausrutinen innebar 
att kirurgen efter två timmars operation skulle bli påmind om att ta en paus, dricka 
ett glas saft och röra på axlarna. Efter fyra timmars operation skulle kirurgen 
uppmuntras att ta ett kortare måltidsuppehåll. Därefter ta en saftpaus varannan 
timme. Utvärderingen skedde med hjälp av frågeformulär till kirurger, 
operationssjuksköterskor, anestesisjuksköterskor och undersköterskor. Många i 
operationsteamet upplevde att teamarbetet och patientsäkerheten förbättrades i 
och med implementering av pausrutinen. Många kirurger angav att de efter paus 
ibland fått en annan syn på anatomin och det hände att de efter paus ändrat 
operationsstrategi. 
Studie II var en interventionell studie med syftet att på en operationsavdelning 
utvärdera en intervention som innebar utbildning i säkerhetsklimat och icke-
tekniska färdigheter samt en förändring i användandet av WHO checklista för 
säker kirurgi. Studiepersoner var kirurger, operationssjuksköterskor, 
anestesisjuksköterskor, anestesiologer och undersköterskor som jobbar i 
operationsteam. Fokusgrupper utfördes vilka efter analys visade att 
operationsteamet var positiva till förslaget att lägga till en punkt i checklistan med 
”operationsbeskrivning av kirurg”. Observationer under operationer angående 
utförandet av checklistan visade att det fans brister i följsamheten både före och 
efter interventionen. Säkerhetsklimat, teamarbete och kommunikation mättes 
före och efter interventionen med frågeformuläret ”the Safety Attitude 
Questionnaire”. Resultatet visade inte på någon förändring från före till efter 
interventionen. De flesta personalkategorier angav att teamarbete och WHO 
checklista är viktigt för patientsäkerheten men upplevde samtidigt att 
kommunikation inom den egna professionen fungerade bäst.   
Studie III hade syftet att undersöka om kirurgers nöjdhet med en operation var 
relaterad till svårigheter och komplikationer som inträffade under operationen. 
Uppgifter om händelser under operationen bokfördes av kirurgen i anslutning till 
respektive operation, liksom kirurgens upplevelse av nöjdhet med utförandet av 
ingreppet. Detta var en del av datainsamlingen i LAPPRO-studien, som jämförde 
utfall mellan öppen operation för borttagande av prostata med robot-assisterad 
titthålskirurgi. Studiepersoner var urologer som opererat i LAPPRO-studien. Vi 
fann ett starkt samband mellan kirurgens nöjdhet med en operation och 
förekomst av svårigheter och komplikationer under operationen. Sambandet blev 
starkare för varje ytterligare negativ händelse. Vi fann inget samband mellan 
operationsmetod  och kirurgens nöjdhet. 
Studie IV var en randomiserad kontrollerad studie som utfördes med syftet att 
jämföra kirurgers stressnivåer vid simulerade operationer med titthålskirurgi där 
man som kirurg antingen blev lottad till att ta en paus med saft under operationen 
eller att inte ta någon paus. Studiepersoner var ST-läkare inom kirurgi eller 
kirurger med högst fem års erfarenhet som specialistläkare. Studiepersoner 
opererade vid två tillfällen och blev vid varje simulering lottad till att ta en paus 
eller inte. Stress mättes genom kortisol i saliv, hjärtfrekvens och självuppskattad 
stress. Frågeformulär delades ut innan och efter simuleringarna, där fanns bland 
annat frågor om kirurgens upplevelse av en paus. Vi fann ingen statistiskt 
signifikant skillnad i kortisol i saliv mellan simulering med en paus eller utan paus. 
Vi fann inte heller någon skillnad i hjärtfrekvens eller i självuppskattad stress. 
Däremot var kirurgernas upplevelse av att ta en paus positiv. 
Slutsats 
Att studera icke-tekniska färdigheter hos operationsteamet är komplext då utfall 
efter kirurgi och patientsäkerhet i samband med kirurgi är multifaktoriellt. 
Operationsteamet angav att teamarbete och kommunikation var viktiga faktorer 
för ökad patientsäkerhet på operationssalen, samtidigt som de angav att den 
införda pausrutinen medförde bättre kommunikation, teamarbete och 
patientsäkerhet. Ett sätt att förbättra teamarbete och kommunikation inom 
operationsteamet och på så sätt även öka patientsäkerheten kan därför vara att ta 
regelbundna pauser under operationer. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 SURGERY 
The number of major surgical procedures performed each year over the world 
have been estimated to approximately 234 million, which implies that one out of 
25 persons each year are going through a major surgical procedure1. In Sweden, 
410 000 operations are performed on admitted patients and about 1.2 million 
surgical procedures on outpatients2.   
A patient undergoing surgery is dependent on the operating team’s ability to 
perform safe surgery and maintain high patient safety in the operating room. The 
responsibility for maintaining safety is shared between different professions, the 
management and organization3. In Sweden, physicians and nurses are legally 
obliged to strive for high patient safety3 4. In addition they have their core 
competencies as a guidance in providing safe care5 6. The ‘Safe care’ competency 
defines patient safety as an ongoing process, always changing and needing to be 
re-assessed over and over again: at the beginning of every new shift or with every 
decision being made, at every level in the organization6.  
 ‘Safe surgery saves lives’, is a declaration by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) that seems obvious, but in reality, safe surgery is complex as the work 
inside the operating room is multifaceted. With many different professionals 
working side by side in a high-tech environment, patient safety becomes complex. 
This thesis will explore some of the different pieces of the big puzzle that together 
forms the picture of safe surgery.  
1.2 INTRAOPERATIVE FACTORS INFLUENCING 
SAFE SURGERY 
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines patient safety as: ‘the absence of 
preventable harm to a patient during the process of health care and reduction of 
risk of unnecessary harm associated with health care to an acceptable minimum’7.  
Patient safety in relation to surgery can be defined as the absence of postoperative 
morbidity and mortality. Morbidity and mortality are two outcome measures 
sometimes used as surrogates for lack of patient safety8-11.  
In the operating room work is complex and covers more than the surgical 
procedure alone12. The work culture, the organization and the safety climate 
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among front-line workers are some factors that can influence safe surgery13-15. 
Others are surgical performance, technical and non-technical skills, patient 
specific factors and comorbidities and intraoperative care16-24.   
In this thesis the following aspects of safe surgery will be considered:  
- intraoperative adverse events 
- safety culture and climate 
- the role of the operating team 
- the WHO surgical safety checklist 
- intraoperative communication and team work 
- management of intraoperative stress and fatigue 
- surgeons’ perception of their technical performance in relation 
to intraoperative difficulties and complications 
1.2.1 ADVERSE EVENTS 
There are several definitions of an adverse event, a summary of them could be 
the following: an adverse event is a medical injury or complication that occurs 
during health care and causes prolonged hospital stay, morbidity, or mortality25-
27. Almost 50% of all adverse events in health care in industrialized countries are 
related to surgical care, and half of those are considered preventable28. With this 
in mind reduction of adverse events in surgical care is important.  
The reporting of adverse events related to surgery in Sweden today is increasing. 
Some of the reasons may be an ageing population, and more advanced surgical 
procedures29. In a study on patients going through abdominal surgery under 
general anesthesia, it was reported that the patients undergoing complex surgical 
procedures are more likely to suffer intraoperative adverse events19. Many of the 
participants in the studies of this thesis work in operating teams performing 
advanced surgery, such as procedures for advanced colorectal cancer, colorectal 
disease, and radical prostatectomies due to prostate cancer30-33. 
The root causes of adverse events are often derived from several interacting 
factors and can be categorized as: human errors, patient-related factors, 
organizational factors, and technical factors34. Many adverse events can be 
avoided with the right prerequisites present25 35. Adverse events from surgical care 
often stem from deficiencies in communication, teamwork and the organization35. 
Strategies recommended to prevent adverse events are evaluation of safety 
behavior, using safety checklists, team training, and quality assurance by incident 
reporting8 34 36-38. 
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1.2.2 SAFETY CULTURE & SAFETY CLIMATE 
Within high-risk environments, there are different views on how to define the 
two concepts safety culture and safety climate. Occasionally both are described as 
the same, and are then usually named safety culture39. In this thesis, the two 
concepts are defined and described separately.  
Safety culture within an organization is here described as a broad term that is 
complex and mirrors the organizations fundamental values and beliefs, expressed 
as basic assumptions. It reflects the way an organization works towards high 
patient safety standards. Positive safety culture within an organization depends on 
the degree to which the organization prioritizes and supports safety 
improvements39 40.  
Safety climate describes the individual employee’s perceptions and attitudes 
towards risks and safety, and can be measured by questionnaires that gives us an 
estimation of the current state of safety climate39 40. It can be beneficial to use 
questionnaires measuring safety climate to assess the function of various 
implemented safety strategies40-44. 
The topic safety within high-risk organizations has its root in the airline industry45 
although the first high-risk organization that was described to have ‘poor safety 
culture’ was the Chernobyl nuclear plant, after the tragedy in 198639.  
Safety management in the health care sector is a more recent discussion, which 
has been inspired by work done in other sectors. The airline industry Crew 
Resource Management tool is a good example of a tool that is often used to 
educate teams in communication and teamwork38 46 47. Another concept 
transferred from the airline industry are human factors engineering48.  
The study of human factors (i.e. ergonomics) is a scientific discipline that are 
defined as; ‘the understanding of the interactions among humans and other 
elements of a system, and the profession that applies theoretical principles, data 
and methods to design in order to optimize human well-being and overall system 
performance’48. The adoption of the human factors approach recognizes the 
complexity of safety within health care. 
Through the years, there has been different views on how to handle safety issues 
within high-risk organizations; a shift has been made from the person approach 
focusing on the errors of frontline personnel associated with naming, blaming, 
and shaming49 to a system approach focusing on pre-existing organizational 
factors that contribute to accidents50.  From the system perspective the term 
patient safety concerns conditions within the system that arises through 
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interactions inside the system51. Patient safety becomes the result of interactions 
between materials, components and processes that take place within the system. 
Therefore, patient safety is complex, with many barriers51. In Sweden, the 
introduction of the patient safety law implied a transition from the person 
approach to an approach with a system-oriented perspective52. In the system 
approach people are expected to make errors, and those errors are seen as 
consequences of the system49. When things go wrong the important issue is to 
understand how and why it happened, not because of whom49. As stated by James 
Reason “We cannot change the human condition, but we can change the 
conditions under which humans work”49. 
Safety within an organization has also been described with the expression 
‘resilience’, where safety within organizations is dependent of the flexibility and 
capacity to transform together with changes within the dynamic system and the 
world53. Safety is the ability to adjust to the current conditions, both within the 
organization and among individuals within the organization. To be able to do so 
the organization has to be one-step ahead with continuous risk-analysis53.  
Many have used the illustration of the Swiss cheese model of accident causation 
where every layer has its own role in preventing accidents49. Some of the holes in 
the cheese are caused by the actions of front-line personnel and others by 
conditions within the system51. The different layers within surgical care could also 
represent political decisions, hospital management, department management, and 
front-line personal at the operating ward, who are the last layer of protection from 
failure or error (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. The Swiss cheese model of accident causation. By James T. 
Reason(1997).With license from: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
sa/3.0/legalcode 
 5 
In this thesis, the different layers of the Swiss cheese will also demonstrate 
different aspects of safety where each study included in the thesis adds different 
layers to enhance patient safety, such as managing intraoperative stress, enhancing 
teamwork, and use of the World Health Organization (WHO) Surgical Safety 
Checklist. 
1.2.3 THE OPERATING TEAM 
The operating team is a multi-professional team consisting of many different 
professions54. The professions included in the team may vary depending on 
country, operating ward and surgical specialty.  The operating team included in 
the studies in this thesis consisted of the following professions: anesthesiologist, 
nurse anesthetist, nurse assistant, scrub nurse, and surgeon. 
Awareness of team dynamics inside the operating room requires a knowledge and 
recognition of the different roles of the team members. The roles will be 
described from a Swedish context where the anesthesiologist is the physician who 
is responsible for providing anesthesia care. Anesthesiology is characterized by an 
intra-professional approach54 where the anesthesiologist work closely together 
with the nurse anesthetist. Often the anesthesiologist is responsible for several 
patients at the same time and he/she is therefore not present in the operating 
room during the entire operation. The nurse anesthetist induces, maintains and 
terminates the general anesthesia with some support of the anesthesiologist, 
works with the patient throughout the procedure and monitor the patient 
closely55. 
As physicians the anesthesiologist and the surgeon are required to possess 
leadership skills, characterized by collaboration, openness and dialogue with the 
other team members56. The surgeon is the physician responsible for the 
performance of the surgical procedure54 and has to be able to work in a multi-
professional team as well as knowing surgical pathophysiology, surgical technique, 
and have some knowledge about effects of anesthesia56.  
The role of the scrub nurse has changed over time and differs between countries 
and operating wards57. In a Swedish setting, the scrub nurse should aim for high 
patient safety by preventing adverse events, ensure asepsis, control and manage 
of biological specimens, and ensure that surgical instruments and towels are not 
left in the body58. In addition, the scrub nurse is responsible for instrumentation 
and also, together with the nurse anesthetist, of the nursing care during surgery55 
58 59. The nurse assistant is an unregistered nurse who assists both the scrubbed 
team and the anesthetic team in the operating room. 
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Although the surgeon is medically responsible for the patient during surgery the 
leadership within the operating room has been described to be distributed over 
the different professions60 61, where in a Swedish context it has been reported that 
the surgeon conducted most of the leadership followed by the scrub nurse and 
nurse anesthetist61. Common for all participants of the operating team is the core 
competencies for health care professions, which include; patient-centered care, 
teamwork and collaboration, evidence-based practice, quality improvement, 
safety, and informatics59 62. Although the core competencies are the same, the 
specific content in each of them differs between the professions.   
Sub-teams within the operating team 
Even if everyone in the operating team has the same main goal, the team consists 
of various sub-teams63 with their own specific sub-culture, tasks and goals during 
an operation.  
- The nurse-team involves the nurse anesthetist, the scrub nurse, 
and the nurse assistant. In a Swedish setting, the nurses work 
together in the operating room with surgical preparations, like 
the positioning of the patient. Inside this team another sub-
team, the specialist nurse-team consisting of the anesthetic 
nurse and the scrub nurse. These two professions are 
responsible for the intraoperative care of the patient55 58.  
 
- The physician-team consists of the surgeon and the 
anesthesiologist. Both professions have a medical education 
with an MD degree, but the training leading to specialist degrees 
differs56.   
 
- The anesthetic team is made up of the anesthesiologist and the 
anesthetic nurse. They cooperate regarding the anesthesia, 
intravenous fluid therapy, and pain treatment of the patient 
undergoing surgery.  
 
- The scrubbed team includes the surgeons and the scrub nurse. 
They are scrubbed in and work in the sterile field. They are 
operating, assisting and instrumenting. The surgeon is 
responsible for the surgical operation and performs the surgery 
and assists. The scrub nurse is in charge of the perioperative 
care, including infection prevention, instrumentation and 
assisting the surgeon.  
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1.2.4 NON-TECHICHAL SKILLS  
In the 1970s the aspects of human factors on accidents in the aircraft industry 
were discussed. These accidents were what generated the interest in the non-
technical skills that have been defined as ‘the cognitive, social and personal 
resource skills that complement technical skills, and contribute to safe and 
efficient task performance’64. These skills are important in high-risk organizations, 
and are often divided into the following seven skills: communication, teamwork, 
leadership, situation awareness, decision-making, managing stress, and coping 
with fatigue64.  
Associations between surgical team behavior and surgical outcome has been 
found where high-quality non-technical skills improves the outcome for the 
patient16 17 65. There are also correlations between non-technical skills and 
technical skills among teams and individuals in the operating team66.  
Non-technical skills further discussed in this thesis are communication, 
teamwork, and managing stress and fatigue.  
Communication & Teamwork  
To communicate means to share67 and can be divided into ‘what information’, 
‘how, the means to communicate’, ‘why, the reason’, and ‘to whom’ 64. One-way 
communication entails a sender of information and a receiver of information. 
This is an easy and rapid way of communicating but lacks the feedback from the 
receiver. Two-way communication has the advantages of confirmation through 
receiver response where the opportunity to form a closed loop exists. In closed 
loop communication, the receiver has the role of confirming that the information 
sent by the sender is understood64 (Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Communication loop 
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Inside the operating room, communication has been shown to be essential for 
teamwork and patient safety8 38 66 68 69. Of all communication during surgery, one-
third has been described as communication failures, which could be categorized 
into ‘occasion’ with poor timing, ‘content’ with incorrect information, ‘purpose’ 
without a solution, and ‘audience’ where key persons were excluded70. Many of 
these communication failures led to visible effects like inefficiency, team tension, 
resource waste, workaround, delay, patient inconvenience, and procedural error.  
Since communication is an essential part of teamwork, the two are often discussed 
together. To enable high quality teamwork and good communication different 
tools have been constructed. The already mentioned Crew Resource Management 
tool is one good example that has been reported to increase the quality of 
teamwork and communication within the operating room38. Another is the WHO 
surgical safety checklist and the communication tool Situation, Background, 
Assessment, Recommendation (SBAR)8 71 all frequently used within surgical care.  
Teamwork has been described as ‘social entities composed of members with high 
task interdependency and shared and valued common goals’, who need to 
integrate, share information, coordinate and cooperate to accomplish their 
work72. Teamwork is one of the core competencies for health care professionals5. 
Teams exists in many contexts and have different prerequisites for performing 
high quality teamwork (Figure 3). The complexity of the multi-professional 
operating team and its many sub-teams has already been mentioned. One aspect 
of the complexity that has been reported is that there seems to be diverse 
perceptions of teamwork and communication between the different professions 
in the operating team63 73-75. 
Figure 3. Teams in different contexts 
Deficiencies in non-technical skills such as teamwork and communication can 
lead to increased morbidity and mortality for the patient8 41. 
Although there are many sub-teams within the surgical team, it is important that 
everyone has a shared mental model, without which teamwork may be 
threatened54. Shared mental models has been described as ‘socially constructed 
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cognitive structures that represent shared knowledge or beliefs about an 
environment and its expected behavior’76. In the operating room where the team 
members may shift from day to day, it can be challenging to create a high 
functioning team with a shared mental model54.  
Managing Stress & Fatigue 
Stress can be both acute and chronic, and part of this thesis will focus on the 
effects of acute stress and possible ways of preventing it. Stress has been defined 
as ‘a particular relationship between the person and the environment that is 
appraised by the persons taxing or exceeding his or her resources and endangering 
his or her well-being’77.  
Stress can have both positive and negative effects on performance78. The positive 
aspects, alertness and enhanced focus, are related to the fight-or-flight response79 
80. Stress in this context can be defined as ‘a constellation of events, consisting of 
a stimulus (stressor), that leads to a reaction in the brain (stress perception), that 
activates physiological fight or flight systems in the body (stress response)’81. 
Stressors, personal resources and mediating factors (personality, fitness, coping 
strategies and social support) have been described to affect how an individual 
responds to stress64 82. 
As mentioned earlier the health care sector has many times been influenced by 
the military and airline industry when it comes to safety issues. The prerequisites 
for the military, pilots, and the operating team varies where the military and pilot 
are risking their own lives while the operating team’s safety concerns the patient. 
But even so there are lessons that can be learned from work cultures with a longer 
tradition of managing stress and safety issues in a structured way. In the military 
training, management of stress is an essential part, where training under stress is 
an important component in developing behavioral and cognitive skills to facilitate 
performance under stress83. This is somewhat different from the surgical scene 
although it has been implied that acute stress may affect the intraoperative 
teamwork, surgical performance, and patient safety negatively, as team members 
under acute stress are more prone to focus on their own tasks instead of working 
effectively as a team84-88.  
Stress can also contribute to increased fatigue, which in turn can have negative 
consequences on cognitive performance, motor skills, communication and social 
skills, all of which may be important for the operating surgeon78 89-92.  
Stress among the professions of the operating team is experienced in different 
ways, where some events are reported to be more stressful than others. Circulating 
nurses (nurse assistants in the studies included in this thesis) have described 
 10 
teamwork performance as particularly stressful, while scrub nurses perceived that 
certain surgical specialties, patient Body Mass Index (BMI), blood loss and 
American Society of Anaesthesiologists (ASA) physical status class related to 
intraoperative stress93. Anaesthesiologists reported that friction in the operating 
teamwork contributed strongly to stress94, while surgeons described surgical 
complications, complex procedures, team factors, time and management, 
distractions, lack of experience, equipment problems and personal problems to 
be stressful in the operating room84 95. Surgeons have also reported that stress 
sometimes affects other surgeons but seldom themselves45 84. An operating team 
where team members support and understand each other are positive for stress 
handling. It has been reported that individuals, who feel the support from other 
team members, and who have a shared mental model, and who have handled 
stressful events together in the past, are better equipped to cope with stress in the 
future64 96. 
It is important to avoid fatigue and reduce negative intraoperative stress among 
the operating team members. Mental practice before performing simulated 
operations have been reported to be one way of reducing stress among novice 
surgeons97. Another way of reducing stress may be by regular work breaks for 
everyone in the team.  Structured work breaks among the professionals in the 
operating team may vary dependent on country, hospital, operating ward, and 
type of operations performed. In some settings, surgeons are performing long 
surgical procedures without pauses. It has been suggested that regular 
intraoperative pauses may be beneficial for the surgeon and the patient, and some 
studies support this98 99. Since intake of sugar has been reported to increase 
performance, reduce cortisol, and enhance self-reported energy during physical 
activity100-102, a beneficial addition to intraoperative pauses may be sugar intake 
for the surgeon and the operating team.   
1.2.5 WHO SURGICAL SAFETY CHECKLIST 
One initiative taken to make surgery safer around the world was the construction 
of the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist. At the time of the development of the 
checklist, there were few medical checklists to be inspired by, hence the model 
was taken from the aviation industry103. The checklist was constructed to be used 
in most surgical settings around the world and is intended to reduce unnecessary 
surgical morbidity and mortality8 103 104 by focusing on the improvement of three 
common and preventable safety issues during surgery: inadequate anesthesia, 
poor communication within the team, and surgical infection8 104. 
The checklist is divided into three phases that follow the normal flow of an 
operation; ‘Sign in’, before induction of anesthesia, ‘Time out’ before incision, 
and ‘Sign out’ before the patient leaves the operating room (Figure 4)8 104.  
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Figure 4. The WHO Surgical Safety Checklist  
In 2009 the results after the implementation of the Surgical Safety Checklist at 
eight different hospitals and countries was published8. The results were 
impressive and showed a significant decrease in both morbidity and mortality. 
The rate for surgical site infections and reoperations also decreased8. An 
evaluation of the safety climate reported that there was a significant increase in 
participants’ safety attitudes post implementation, and 93.4% stated that they 
would want the checklist to be used, if they were having surgery themselves41. A 
conclusion was that the changes seen in the safety climate could be a part of the 
effect the checklist.  
The WHO states that the implementation of the checklist is very important for 
the outcome105 and has encouraged local modifications of the checklist to fit 
different settings. When changing the checklist, essential safety items should not 
be removed, but new items considered important for patient safety can be 
added103. Since the first implementation, the checklist has been implemented in 
many countries and hospitals. The effect of the implementation has varied, and 
there seems to be great variation in how the checklist is performed106. Some of 
the outcomes reported by the use of the checklist are: decreased mortality rate8-10 
107, and decreased postoperative complication rate8 9 108, among those a decreased 
rate of postoperative infections8 108 and re-operations8 109, and shorter length of 
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hospital stay110. A meta-analysis of seven studies using the Surgical Safety 
Checklist (one study used a modified version of the checklist) indicated that the 
implementation of the checklist had led to a reduction in complications, wound 
infections and blood loss, although they did not find a significant reduction in 
mortality or re-operations111. Another meta-analysis showed reductions in both 
morbidity and mortality11, and other studies have not been able to demonstrate a 
reduction in morbidity112 or mortality113. 
Since there seems to be a variation of the effects of the use of the checklist, 
compliance to the checklist have been studied, which have indicated that there is 
often a lack in the adherence to the checklist where most times the checklist is 
initiated but not completed114-116. The lack of compliance to the checklist has been 
described as leading to a false sense of security114 115, and one study demonstrated 
a correlation between checklist compliance and postoperative mortality rate, 
where mortality rate was significantly decreased when the compliance was high117.  
Barriers to effective use of the Surgical Safety Checklist seems to be 
multifactorial116 118 119. One could reason that it has roots in both organizational, 
cultural and climate dimensions. Some barriers that have been found in studies 
are: duplication of items within the checklist, poor communication, time for 
completion of the checklist, and lack of understanding of the benefit of the 
items116. Other identified barriers to a successful implementation of checklists 
include discipline-specific factors, where physicians are more likely to succeed 
with an implementation than nurses are, and the involvement of frontline 
personnel in the design and implementation process of the checklist120 121. A 
review of the barriers and facilitators suggested that a successful implementation 
requires more than the elimination of barriers and suggests that implementation 
leaders must foster a mutual understanding of the importance of the checklist by 
rearranging routines and facilitate team learning122. This is in line with the 
recommendation to implement the checklist as an integrated part of risk-
management including education to enhance the understanding of safety123. 
In a recent qualitative study on perceived risk factors during surgery, both patients 
and health care workers specified a need of a surgical safety checklist124. 
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2 AIMS OF THE THESIS 
The overall aim of the thesis was to study some intraoperative factors that may 
be related to patient safety in the operating room. 
The specific aims of the four studies were: 
I. To explore how the operating team members perceived a 
pause routine and its’ implementation.  
 
II. To evaluate the teamwork and the safety climate in a 
Swedish operating room setting before and after an 
intervention including education, focus groups and 
implementation of a revised version of the WHO checklist. 
 
III. To evaluate if intraoperative difficulties or complications 
during a radical prostatectomy (open retropubic and robot 
assisted laparoscopic) was associated with surgeons’ self-
assessed satisfaction with the performance. 
 
IV. To study whether the surgeons’ stress levels were affected 
by an intraoperative pause during simulated operations. 
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3 METHODS & METHODOLOGICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Research questions regarding non-technical skills and intraoperative factors in the 
operating room are to some extent interdisciplinary and can be explored with 
different methods. To answer the four different research questions in this thesis 
the studies used different study designs, data collections, and data analysis. As the 
overall aim of the thesis was to study some intraoperative factors that may be 
related to patient safety in the operating room, the study participants consisted of 
different professions in the operating team: anesthesiologists, nurse anesthetists, 
nurse assistants, scrub nurses and surgeons. Both qualitative and quantitative 
methods were used in the attempt to answer our research questions (Table 1). 
3.1 CAUSAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND 
STUDY DESIGN 
The choice of scientific method is dependent on the type of research aim we seek 
to address. One important distinction is whether the aim is to address a causal 
relationship. A causal research question is about whether the outcome will change 
or not depending on an intervention. For example, will teamwork in the operating 
room be enhanced by the implementation of the WHO surgical safety checklist? 
An example of a non-causal research question could be the prediction of an 
outcome: Can we predict the level of teamwork in the operating room dependent 
on the compliance of the WHO surgical safety checklist?   
To answer a question on causality there is a need to control for factors that may 
influence the outcome, in other words there is a need for separation of the causal 
effect from confounding factors. The randomized controlled trial is an 
appropriate method used to answer causal research questions, since it determines 
causal inference without presence of systematic errors, i.e. bias.  
Even though the research question is causal, it may not be possible to construct 
a randomized controlled trial, hence the study design will have to control for 
confounding factors present due to the lack of randomization. In observational 
studies, the influence of confounding factors is always present; hence, there is a 
risk of the presence of bias.  
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Table 1. Overview of the studies included in the thesis 
Study Objectives Participants  Design Data 
collection 
Primary 
outcome 
I To explore how 
the operating 
team members 
perceived a 
pause routine 
and its 
implementation 
Nurse anesthetists, 
Nurse assistants, 
Scrub nurses, 
Surgeons   
Retrospective 
evaluation  
Questionnaires The operating 
teams’ 
professions 
perspectives 
on an 
intraoperative 
pause routine 
 
II To evaluate 
teamwork and 
safety climate 
before and after 
an intervention 
including 
education, 
focus groups 
and 
implementation 
of a revised 
version of the 
WHO checklist 
 
Anesthesiologists, 
Nurse anesthetists, 
Nurse assistants, 
Scrub nurses, 
Surgeons 
Prospective 
interventional 
study 
Questionnaires 
Focus groups 
Observations 
Changes in 
SAQ** from 
baseline to 
post-
intervention  
III To evaluate if 
intraoperative 
difficulties or 
complications 
during a 
prostatectomy 
was associated 
with surgeons’ 
self-assessed 
satisfaction 
with the 
performance  
 
Surgeons  Prospective 
controlled 
Trial - 
LAPPRO 
Questionnaires 
CRF* 
Surgeon’s 
perceived 
satisfaction 
with the 
surgical 
procedure 
IV To study 
whether the 
surgeons’ stress 
levels were 
affected by an 
intraoperative 
pause during 
simulated 
operations 
 
Surgical residents, 
Surgeons  
Randomized 
controlled 
cross-over 
study 
Salivary 
cortisol 
Heart rate 
Questionnaires 
CRF* 
Changes in 
salivary 
cortisol 
between pre-
intervention 
and post-
intervention 
*CRF Clinical Record Form 
**SAQ Safety Attitude Questionnaire 
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3.2 PERCEPTIONS OF A PAUSE ROUTINE -
STUDY I 
3.2.1 CONTEXT  
This study was a retrospective evaluation of the implementation of an 
intraoperative pause routine at our operating ward, which was introduced in 2013.  
The background of this study was that the unit for Colorectal surgery had 
implemented an intraoperative pause routine. The Colorectal unit was a referral 
center for both inflammatory bowel disease and advanced colorectal cancer, 
therefore the operating procedures were many times complex and operating times 
often long.  
At the time for the introduction of the pause routine the nurses and 
anesthesiologists of the operating team already had scheduled breaks, hence the 
pause routine was introduced specifically with regard to the surgeons. Apart from 
the surgeons employed at the Colorectal unit, the pause routine indirectly affected 
the nurse anesthetists, the nurse assistants, and the scrub nurses. 
By conducting this study, we would receive knowledge on how the different 
professions of the operating team perceived the pause routine, and if they 
expected the intraoperative pauses to affect the operation, the surgeon and the 
teamwork. 
3.2.2 DESIGN AND OUTCOME MEASUREMENTS 
The pause routine consisted of a short break of one to two minutes including a 
glass of liquid refreshment. The pauses took place every other hour, and after 
about four hours of surgery, a longer pause with a snack or quick lunch was taken. 
In case of a longer pause, the patient had to be stable and everyone in the team 
apart from the surgeons remained in the operating room. A pause was also 
encouraged after an adverse event or when having trouble with the surgical 
strategy.  
To explore the operating teams’ experiences, we estimated that a questionnaire 
would be useful for the data collection. Since it was the experiences of the study 
participants that were of interest, we could also have chosen a qualitative 
approach with questionnaires with more open-ended questions, focus groups or 
interviews. The evaluation of the operating teams’ perception of the pause routine 
was made by four different questionnaires, one for each participating profession: 
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nurse anesthetists, nurse assistants, scrub nurses, and surgeons (Appendix 1), in 
2015. 
To compare operating times before and after the implementation of the pause 
routine operating times for all rectal cancer procedures from 2011 and 2014 were 
obtained from data registries. Rectal cancer procedures were chosen since they 
often have an operating time over four hours, and therefore are influenced by the 
pause routine.  
3.2.3 QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT 
The questionnaires constructed contained items relating to different aspects of 
the surgical teams’ perception of the pause (Supplement 1). The questionnaires 
were face validated on members of operating teams at an operating ward not 
included in the study, as it would seem important to validate the questionnaire on 
persons as similar as possible to the study participants. When face validating a 
questionnaire, the researcher observes a person filling out the questionnaire, 
hesitations or questions are noted, and the questionnaire is revised until there are 
no remaining question marks. This process ensures that items are understood by 
the target group125.  
3.2.4 ANALYSIS AND STATISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
Descriptive statistics were used to analyze the operating teams’ perception of the 
implementation of the pause routine, which were described in percentage and 
proportion. No comparisons between the different professions were performed 
as we aimed to describe the study participants’ perceptions.   
Differences in operating time from 2011 and 2014 were analyzed with a two-
sample t-test, since the two groups analyzed were independent of each other and 
operation time was assumed to be normally distributed. 
3.2.5 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Selection bias refers to potential differences between groups that may exist and 
influence the result. When including study participants there is always a possibility 
of selection bias. In this study the amount of missing data was substantial as only 
64% answered the questionnaires. For the data to be valid in addressing our 
research question, it is important to assess whether the missing data was random. 
We concluded that there is a possibility that the participants who choose to 
answer were more interested in the research question. If this was the case, the 
pattern of missing data is not at random and thus the study participants were not 
a representative sample of the target population. The consequence of this was 
that the study results will be biased, i.e. the results will give rise to systematic 
 18 
errors. This is further implied by the response rate of the surgeons (94%) and 
scrub nurses (74 %), as a pause routine affects the scrubbed sub-team in a more 
distinct way; during surgery they are normally not able to take short pauses or a 
sugar-containing drink.  
When questionnaires are being used, one should always be aware of the possibility 
of recall-bias. The possibility of recall-bias is a potential concern in retrospective 
studies. The questionnaires asked the participants whether the intraoperative 
pause routine made things better, for example if the teamwork was better. To be 
able to answer this type of questions, the study-participants had to rely on their 
memories of how it was before the introduction of the pause routine, hence the 
possibility of recall-bias. One way to avoid recall-bias could have been to 
construct a prospective interventional study, where the same questions were asked 
before and after implementation of the pause routine.  
A limitation in this study is that one profession among the operating team, the 
anesthesiologists were not included. There were two reasons for not including 
them. They were rarely present during the pauses since they often were 
responsible for multiple operations at the same time but the nurse anesthetist was 
attendant during the surgical procedure. In addition, the anesthesiologist were 
reluctant to participate in study II and were therefore not asked to participate in 
this study. By not including the anesthesiologists, we cannot describe all members 
of the operating team’s perception of the pause routine.      
3.3 SAFETY ATTITUDES & TEAMWORK – 
STUDY II 
3.3.1 CONTEXT  
This study was a prospective single center interventional study, where both 
qualitative and quantitative methods were used. The study was conducted from 
November 2014 to June 2015 with the aim to evaluate the teamwork and the 
safety climate in a Swedish operating room setting before and after the 
intervention consisting of education, focus groups and the implementation of a 
revised version of the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist.  
Previous research had indicated that the use of the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist 
in combination with compliance to the checklist could contribute to safer surgery8 
117.  Among members of the operating team in our research group a lack of focus 
during the performance of the checklist was experienced. We wanted to study the 
different professions’ attitudes to the Surgical Safety Checklist, and to understand 
why the presentation of the checklist often failed. At the same time, we wanted 
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to re-educate the operating team about the importance of using the checklist as it 
was intended, and to get the entire operating team committed to the performance 
of the checklist.  
We hypothesized that by using the Surgical Safety Checklist in a structured 
fashion and by adding the item, ‘description of the surgical procedure’ 
commitment to the checklist and intraoperative teamwork would be improved. 
Our intention with this item was to increase the team’s shared mental model, 
teamwork and clinical assessment by getting a more in-depth explanation of the 
patient, the underlying indication for surgery, and the surgical procedure.  
3.3.2 DESIGN 
All members of the operating team participated in the study. Since the 
implementation of the checklist in 2009, there had been no further education on 
the importance of using the checklist. The study started with an information 
meeting where the study participants received information that a study regarding 
the work inside the operating room would be conducted, and that we wanted to 
measure the safety climate at baseline before the start of the study. Then, the 
Safety Attitude Questionnaire was distributed followed by baseline observations 
and focus groups. The intervention started with educational meetings with 
information on safety culture, safety climate, the importance of the WHO Surgical 
Safety Checklist, and non-technical skills in the operating room, followed by focus 
groups and lastly by a re-implementation (January 2015) of the revised Surgical 
Safety Checklist. The post-intervention period occurred during 4 months (January 
- May 2015), the post-intervention questionnaire Safety Attitude Questionnaire 
was distributed in June 2015 (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. Timeline for Study II. *Safety Attitude Questionnaire, ** Surgical Safety 
Checklist 
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3.3.3 OUTCOME MEASUREMENTS 
The Safety Attitude Questionnaire 
The Safety Attitude Questionnaire Operating Room version was used126 which 
assessed the operating teams perception of safety climate, teamwork, and 
communication. The questionnaire consists of six domains; Teamwork Climate, 
Job Satisfaction, Perception of Management, Safety Climate, Stress Recognition, 
and Working conditions126. In addition to the items in the six domains the Safety 
Attitude Questionnaire includes questions regarding the quality of 
communication and collaboration within and between professions; a number of 
independent questions not included in the domains and therefore not analyzed in 
this study, and one open ended question.  
The Safety Attitude Questionnaire Operating Room version had been translated 
to Swedish127. The original Safety Attitude Questionnaire Operating Room 
version and the Swedish version were validated and reported to have both 
adequate reliability and validity126-128. 
Two parts of the questionnaire had not been previously translated to Swedish. We 
performed a back-and-forward translation129 and face validation of the sections 
‘Use the scale to describe the quality of communication and collaboration you 
have experienced with: surgeons, anesthesiologists, scrub nurses, nurse 
anesthetists and nurse assistants’ and the open ended question ‘What are your top 
three recommendations for improving patient safety in the operating room?’ 
(Appendix 2). 
The Safety Attitude Questionnaire was used at baseline (November 2014) and 
post-intervention (June 2015) to assess changes is domain scores and the section 
regarding collaboration and communication and the open-ended question (Figure 
5). Some of the reasons for choosing the Safety Attitude Questionnaire Operating 
Room version to evaluate the intervention was that the questionnaire had been 
translated to Swedish and validated in a Swedish operating room context. Since it 
has been used in earlier studies, there was an opportunity to compare our results 
with those of others.  
Structured Observations 
Structured observations with a pre-defined clinical record form was made at 
baseline and post-intervention (Figure 5). The clinical record form was tested in 
a clinical setting and thereafter revised before being used. The observations were 
conducted in operating rooms, during surgery with the aim to gather information 
about the performance of the surgical safety checklist. When performing 
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observations there is always the risk of influencing the study participants being 
observed, this is called the Hawthorne effect130. In this study the observer was 
one of the operating nurses working at the operating ward, which might have 
reduced the Hawthorne effect as she was dressed like the operating team, and was 
a part of the operating team and not a stranger.  
To reach saturation the observations were performed until there was no additional 
information gained through further observations. Saturation during data 
collection is always an important factor using qualitative methods and refers to 
when no new information is gathered through more data collection131.  
3.3.4 FOCUS GROUPS & THE REVISED WHO SURGICAL 
SAFETY CHECKLIST 
Six focus groups sessions, separated by profession, with the aim to discuss the 
checklist were performed (Figure 5). During the focus groups participants were 
informed about the suggestion of adding the item ‘Description of the surgical 
procedure’. To ensure that each focus group had the same prerequisites to discuss 
the checklist the same questions were asked to all focus groups. Analysis resulted 
in two categories: ‘Inadequate structure concerning the WHO Surgical Safety 
Checklist’ and ‘Benefits of improved description of the surgical procedure’ that 
were used in the revision of the Surgical Safety Checklist used as part of the 
intervention, the changes in the checklist were (Figure 6): 
1. The checklist coordinator filled out the Surgical Safety 
Checklist on paper at every operation.  
2. At Sign in, the item ‘presence of metal implant’ was added. 
3. At Time out, ‘description of the surgical procedure’ was 
added. This item was presented to the study participants 
during the focus groups. All focus groups were positive to 
the change.   
4. At Time out, ‘How to manage incoming telephone calls’ was 
added.  
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Figure 6. The revised Surgical Safety Checklist. The red markings show the changes 
made to the checklist.  
3.3.5 ANALYSIS AND STATISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used in the attempt to answer the 
research question ‘is there any change in teamwork climate, communication and 
collaboration by the intervention and the revised WHO Surgical Safety Checklist?’ 
Often qualitative and quantitative research complement each other by tackling 
different kinds of research questions, or by addressing the same issue from 
different aspects132. The qualitative features of this thesis entails a more thorough 
understanding of different aspects of teamwork, and experiences of using the 
WHO Surgical Safety Checklist, here it complements the questionnaires analyzed 
with quantitative methods, that evaluate the safety climate and teamwork within 
the operating team before and after the intervention. 
Qualitative content analysis133 was used to analyze information gathered at the 
focus groups, from the observations, and from the open-ended question in the 
Safety Attitude Questionnaire ‘What are your top three recommendations for 
improving patient safety in the operating room?’. The qualitative content analysis 
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was chosen since we wanted to stay close to the text and categorize and describe 
what the study participants said or wrote. The manifest content analysis helped 
us to analyze the text in a structured way, sorted by categories. With the content 
analysis, we focused on what was read and obvious in the text, we did not try to 
interpret the text or seek a deeper understanding133.  
We were interested in studying intra-individual changes, and the groups analyzed 
compared at baseline and post-intervention were dependent on each other. 
Therefore, we used a Paired t-test and a linear model adjusting for the baseline 
value (ANCOVA) to analyze the intra-individual and intra-professional changes 
for the Safety Attitude Questionnaire domain scores. The dependency between 
the groups consists of the same study participants answering the Safety Attitude 
Questionnaire at both times.  
The results from the ‘collaboration and communication’ part of the study was 
demonstrated with a cross-table, where the study participants evaluated the 
communication and collaboration within their own profession and with the other 
professionals included in the study. 
3.3.6 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS  
The research question whether the intervention changed safety climate and 
teamwork in the operating room was causal, but even so the study was designed 
as an interventional non-randomized study. We discussed the possibility to design 
a randomized trial, but due to practical reasons, it was not considered possible 
since the operating teams included in the study were flexible, with a change of 
team members from day to day. Instead of having a control group the study was 
designed to be able to assess intra-individual comparisons where every study 
participant became their own control.  
3.4 SURGEON SATISFACTION - STUDY III 
3.4.1 CONTEXT 
The third study was conducted with data collected within the prospective, non-
randomized, multicenter, controlled Laparoscopic Prostatectomy Robot Open 
(LAPPRO) trial125 that compared open radical prostatectomy, with robot-assisted 
laparoscopic prostatectomy, with the primary outcome urinary incontinence one 
year after surgery30. 
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This study has its origin in a discussion in our research group whether the 
surgeons’ satisfaction with an operation was of importance for the outcome, and 
difficulties and technical problems.  
Surgeons operating in the LAPPRO-trial filled out a clinical record form after 
each operation without knowing how each item would be used. The clinical 
record form included questions on various parts of the surgical technique (for 
example degree of nerve sparing), about difficulties and complications, and also 
on the surgeon’s experienced degree of satisfaction with the operation performed. 
This data were used to answer the research question for the current study that 
was conducted with the hypothesis that surgeons’ self-perceived satisfaction with 
a surgical procedure was associated with intraoperative difficulties and 
complications.  
3.4.2 DESIGN & OUTCOME MEASUREMENTS 
The study participants were all surgeons, operating patients included in the 
LAPPRO-trial. They performed the operations at 14 different medical centers in 
Sweden. To be included in this study they had to have reported their own 
identifiable study-id in the intraoperative clinical record form. 
The outcome variable ‘surgeon satisfaction’ was collected from the surgical 
clinical record form and the question ‘How satisfied are you with the performed 
surgical procedure technically?’ (Appendix 3). 
The clinical record form used was based on quality control forms used at two of 
the departments participating in the trial. A group of experts revised the clinical 
record form to function in daily practice, which was then validated in a clinical 
setting by face validation, and revised until there were no more hesitations or 
questions125. 
3.4.3 ANALYSIS AND STATISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
To answer the research question, whether there was an association between 
intraoperative difficulties, complications and surgeon satisfaction, a hierarchical 
i.e. multi-level (mixed effect) logistic regression with an intra-surgeon dependency 
by a random intercept and with a variance component covariance structure was 
used. 
The hierarchical aspect in the model implies that we have taken into account that 
most surgeons have operated many patients included in the study. Surgeons tend 
to respond quite similarly and therefore, there is a dependency between patients 
operated on by the same surgeon (intra-surgeon dependency). The random 
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intercept implies that the surgeons were allowed to start wherever they wanted on 
the ‘scale of surgeon satisfaction’. 
Our primary outcome ‘surgeon satisfaction’ was dichotomized to be binary, ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’. When summarizing binary data they are often presented in odds and odds 
ratios. The odds ratios can be described as ‘the odds that an outcome will occur 
given a particular exposure, compared to the odds of the outcome occurring in 
the absence of that exposure’134’. We choose to present our data with odds ratios 
(OR) and confidence intervals (CI). 
Adjustments for the two different surgical procedures open radical prostatectomy 
and robot assisted laparoscopic prostatectomy, tumor stage, and prostate weight 
were performed. The two surgical procedures were analyzed separately regarding 
the variables operating time and blood loss since there are a known difference 
regarding those factors between the two procedures.  
3.4.4 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The present research question was whether the satisfaction of the surgeons was 
influenced by intraoperative difficulties or complications. To use data from a 
national large study with data already collected was regarded as an effective way 
to answer our research question.  
3.5 INTRAOPERATIVE STRESS - STUDY IV  
3.5.1 CONTEXT 
This study was a randomized controlled trial performed in the laparoscopic 
simulator LapSim® with the additional software TeamSim®, and was conducted 
with a two-period crossover design at a room at a University Hospital designed 
for laparoscopic simulations and to mirror an operating room.  
The aim was to evaluate if the pause routine previously studied (study I) affected 
intraoperative stress levels. The hypothesis was that an intraoperative pause with 
a sugar-containing drink would decrease surgeon’s intraoperative stress levels. 
3.5.2 DESIGN 
All residents in training to become surgeons and surgeons with a maximum of 
five years’ experience in the profession, who were employed at three hospitals 
within the Region Västra Götaland were asked to participate in the study. To be 
included in the study they had to be able to perform a standard laparoscopic 
appendectomy without help from a senior college. Exclusion criteria were: 
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smokers, Addison’s disease, medication with steroids or medication affecting 
heart rate. The reason for choosing residents and surgeons with maximum five 
years of experience was to find participants who were similar in regard to 
laparoscopic experience. Including more experienced surgeons would have 
increased the number of possible participants but it is possible that more 
experienced surgeons may not have perceived the simulations as stressful enough, 
as the LapSim® is constructed as a teaching tool to shorten the laparoscopic 
learning curve. The exclusion criteria for study participants were decided from 
some of the known confounding factors of salivary cortisol and heart rate. 
Sample size was calculated for the primary endpoint change in salivary cortisol98 
135 136. A 35% reduction in salivary cortisol between stressful operations and not 
stressful operations had previously been reported135.  With 80 % power and a two 
sided test at a 5% significance level, we included 17 participants to be able to 
detect a 35% reduction in mean salivary cortisol. Study participants operated in 
the simulator at two different occasions, so called periods, in total each period 
took about 2 h to 2.45 h. During each period four simulated operations were 
performed; appendectomy, cholecystectomy, retrocekal appendectomy, and 
cholecystectomy. Each period consisted of a pre-intervention phase and a post-
intervention phase with the intervention, if any in between (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Timeline simulations. *Pause = 3 min, **Simulation time varied between 
0:40 hours to 2:02 hours.  
The intervention consisted of a three-minute long pause including a sugar-
containing drink. The study participants were randomized to ‘pause’ or to ‘no 
pause’ (Figure 7). 
By randomizing the study participants to the four different sequences: ‘pause – 
no pause’, ‘no pause –pause’, ‘pause –pause’, ‘no pause – no pause’ (Figure 8), and 
not to the two sequences: ‘pause – no pause’ and ‘no pause –pause’, we 
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ascertained blinding. A negative aspect of the four sequences was that we lost the 
possibility to study the difference between ‘pause’ and ‘no pause’ for four of the 
17 participants. 
Both study participants and researchers were blinded to conceal the group 
allocation until time for the intervention. Blinding was done to prevent both 
surgeons and researcher from behaving in a different way, depending on if they 
were going to have an intraoperative pause or not.   
Figure 8. Randomization to one of the four sequences.  
3.5.3 OUTCOME MEASURMENTS 
The outcome measures were chosen to display both objective and subjective 
aspects on stress therefore we chose salivary cortisol, heart rate and the Stait-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory and surgeons self-perceived assessment of the pause.   
The Imperial Stress Assessment Tool is a validated tool to capture both subjective 
(self-report State-Trait Anxiety Inventory) and objective (heart rate, cortisol) 
responses to stress during surgery135 137.  
Since the Imperial Stress Assessment Tool has reported a correlation between the 
three methods to measure stress it was evaluated to be a good way to measure 
stress in this study. Except from the adjustments made in the analysis of salivary 
cortisol other actions were taken in the design of the study to decrease 
confounding factors affecting the salivary cortisol. Study participants were 
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instructed to not eat, drink (other than water), use “snus” (tobacco/ dry snuff) or 
brush their teeth for one hour before each simulation. When arriving to the 
simulations the study participants noted time for last drink and food in a 
questionnaire and the time for the first salivary cortisol was at sometimes adjusted 
after this. The diurnal variation in cortisol levels was taken into account by starting 
each simulation at approximately the same time either at 9 am or at 1 pm.   
Change in heart rate was measured with the Polar H10 pulse-band 
(https://www.polar.com) that the study participants applied at the arrival at the 
simulation room. As we wanted to synchronize the heart rate measurements with 
the simulation time, we started to monitor the heart rate at the same time as the 
simulation started. It could have been better to start the monitoring of the heart 
rate when the study participants arrived to get a correct baseline measurement.   
Four different questionnaires were used before and after the simulations. 
Surgeons’ perception of the intraoperative pause was made by using two 
questions from Study I, ‘Has the pause made you handle problems in a better 
way?’, and ‘Do you feel more alert after a pause?’138. The reason for choosing 
these items was that they did not treat the teamwork or communication aspect 
and were assessed to suit the design of the present study. 
The questionnaires included the short version of the Stait-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
questionnaire139 140 that was used to assess change from pre- to post-intervention 
in self-perceived stress. Except from being a part of the Imperial Stress 
Assessment Tool135 the Stait-Trait Anxiety Inventory139 was chosen as it measures 
stress and is responsive to changes in stress141 and we wanted to be able to detect 
a change in stress between a simulation with and without pause. It has also been 
used in the surgical environment before97 135 142.  
The Safety Attitude Questionnaire ‘stress recognition’ domain was included to 
evaluate the surgeons’ awareness of how their surgical performance are normally 
influenced by stress126 (Appendix 4), as it seemed important to get an 
understanding of the study participants preunderstanding of intraoperative stress.  
During each simulation there were two researchers present. One of the 
researchers is a scrub nurse and tried to have the same influence on each 
simulation. The study participants were instructed to talk to the researcher as if 
she was their scrub nurse. The researcher changed laparoscopic instruments when 
requested by the study participant. During the simulations, the researchers 
collected data on time for each period, time for salivary cortisol sampling, and 
time and type of each stressor added with the TeamSim® software.  
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3.5.4 ANALYSIS AND STATISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
The calculation of change from pre-intervention to post-intervention was 
performed on the log-scale, since salivary cortisol was presumed to be non-
normally distributed. The following statistical model was used, a mixed effect 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with intervention/no intervention, period and 
sequence as fixed effects, and subject nested within sequence as random effect. 
The covariate included in the model was mean log cortisol at baseline. 
There are many confounding factors that potentially could influence salivary 
cortisol, to account for some of them adjustments were made regarding treatment 
(intervention or control), period, sequence, subject nested within sequence, and 
time for simulation (9am or 1pm). 
3.5.5 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS  
This was an experimental study performed in a laparoscopic simulator. In the 
design phase we discussed designing the study as a clinical trial in an operating 
room, but since the clinical setting would have meant multiple confounding 
factors regarding surgeons’ stress levels we preferred a more controlled 
environment. The confounding factors in the operating room during surgical 
procedures with the entire operating team present would have made it more 
difficult to quantify causal relationships. The standardized simulator environment 
with pre-specified operations and stressors implies a model where each study 
participant are exposed to the same amount of stress during each simulation, 
making it easier to control for confounding factors and assess causality. 
In cross-over studies one should always be aware of the possibility of a carry-over 
effect between the two periods, however we did not assess that there was a risk 
in this study. Since the study participants’ experiences from the first period exist 
during the second period, it is likely that a period effect is present. We did note a 
possible period effect since the participants performed the same simulation at two 
different occasions, where they performed the second simulation faster, but 
seemed to be more stressed before the second simulation, reflected in the 
outcome measurements.  
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3.6 ETHICAL APPROVAL  
For study I, an ethical approval was not considered as needed, since the study was 
a retrospective evaluation of an already implemented routine. Before the 
distribution of the questionnaires the professionals of the operating team were 
informed that participation in the study was voluntary.  
Ethical approval was obtained for study II by the Regional Ethical Board in 
Göteborg, EPN dnr 958-14, for study III the Regional Ethical Review Board in 
Sweden (EPN Dnr. 277-07) approved the LAPPRO trial, and study IV obtained 
the ethical approval from the Swedish Ethical Committee (Dnr: 2019-02316).  
 
In the second study the management approved of the changes in routine 
(information/education, focus groups, observations and introduction of a revised 
checklist), and the participants consented to participate by answering one or both 
questionnaires, in accordance with the ethical permission.  
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4 RESULTS 
The results from the four studies will be presented separately.  
Table 2. Overview of primary and secondary outcomes for the four studies 
included in the thesis 
Results 
Study Primary outcomes Secondary outcomes 
I The operating teams’ different 
professions perspectives on the 
intraoperative pause routine was 
positive 
Operating times from before to after 
implementation of the pause routine did 
not change 
II There were no significant changes in 
the SAQ* ‘Safety Climate’, ‘Teamwork 
Climate’ or ‘Communication and 
Collaboration’ from baseline to post-
intervention  
Observations showed a lack of structure 
and low compliance regarding the use 
of the Surgical Safety Checklist 
III The odds of surgeon satisfaction 
decreased for each intraoperative 
difficulty and complication (0.60, 0.56; 
0.63)  
There was no difference in surgeon 
satisfaction between the two procedures 
ORP**, RALP*** 
Operative time and blood loss 
decreased when surgeons were satisfied  
IV There was no statistically significant 
change in salivary cortisol between pre-
intervention and post-intervention 
phase, mean ratio 
0.92(95%CI0:75;1.18) 
Surgeons’ perception of taking a pause 
was positive 
There were no changes in heart rate or 
self-perceived stress from before to 
after the intervention 
*Safety Attitude Questionnaire, **Open radical prostatectomy, ***Robot assisted 
laparoscopic prostatectomy 
 
 
 
 
 32 
4.1 PERCEPTIONS OF A PAUSE ROUTINE -
STUDY I 
Teamwork and communication were perceived as better after a pause; many of 
the scrub nurses stated that it was easier to communicate with the surgeons after 
a pause (Figure 9). There were also comments on more alert and less irritable 
surgeons after a pause. There was no significant change in operation time from 
before the implementation of the pause routine to after.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Results from Study I. The operating team’s perception of the 
intraoperative pause routine, shown as number of participants from each profession 
answering the question.  
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4.2 SAFETY ATTITUDES & TEAMWORK – 
STUDY II 
Baseline observations of the performance of the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist 
showed that many of the items in the checklist were often omitted. 
When study participants suggested important factors for increased patient safety, 
many mentioned the use of the Surgical Safety Checklist and specified that the 
focus during the performance was important. Interestingly there were at baseline 
comments regarding extended information about the surgical procedure during 
‘Time out’. Preoperative planning, an open climate, respect for each other, and 
improved communication and teamwork were also stated as important. Focus by 
all professions on the operation were specified as important by the scrubbed sub-
team, surgeons and scrub nurses. To reduce stress and to follow clinical guidelines 
and routines were stated as important.  
There was no change from baseline to post-intervention in the quality of 
communication and collaboration between operating team members, but the 
different professions had diverse experiences of communication and 
collaboration amongst the operating team, where most professions stated that 
communication and collaboration functioned best within their own profession.  
The intervention with the education, focus groups and the revised Surgical Safety 
Checklist did not result in a change in the Safety Attitude Questionnaire domain 
scores for either ‘Safety Climate’ or ‘Teamwork Climate’. Doctors scored 
significantly higher than nurses did in the domain “Teamwork Climate”, both at 
baseline and post-intervention. The nurse assistants scored significantly higher in 
the domain ‘Safety Climate’ post-intervention.   
Observations post-intervention showed at ‘Sign in’ a lack of coordination and 
structure, where the nurse anesthetist and nurse assistant alone often performed 
‘Sign in’ after ‘Time out’. At ‘Time out’ the quality depended on the individuals 
performing the checklist and was often performed with a lack of focus, where 
team members did not listen to each other. The added item ‘Description of the 
surgical procedure’ was many times imperfect, which made the nurses frustrated. 
‘Sign out’ was affected by a lack of structure and with an unfocused team.  
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4.3 SURGEON SATISFACTION - STUDY III 
The surgeons were satisfied respectively dissatisfied in 2905 (81%) and 702 (19%) 
of the surgical procedures included in the study. Surgeon satisfaction did not 
differ regarding surgical technique, open radical prostatectomy vs. robot-assisted 
laparoscopic OR 1.36 (95%CI:0.76;2.43). There were strong associations between 
intraoperative difficulties and complications and the surgeons’ satisfaction; the 
odds of surgeon satisfaction decreased for each intraoperative difficulty and 
complication OR 0.60(95%CI:0.56;0.63) (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10. Results  Study III, Odds ratios and 95% CI for associations between the 
surgeons’ satisfaction and intraoperative difficulties and complications   
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4.4 INTRAOPERATIVE STRESS - STUDY IV  
Simulation time differed between 0.40h and 2:02h and the median (interquartile 
range) time for the first period was longer than the second one 1:39h (0.33) vs. 
1:06h (0.10).  
Salivary cortisol during the pre-intervention phase was higher than median (IQR) 
4.9(3.5) nmol/l it was during the post-intervention phase independent on control 
4.3(2.39) nmol/l or intervention 4.6(2.10) nmol/l. There was no statistically 
significant difference between the intervention and the control group, mean ratio 
0.92(95%CI:0.72;1.18). 
Most surgeons had positive experiences of taking a pause, 9/16 surgeons stated 
that they handled problems in a better way, and 14/16 surgeons felt more alert 
after an intraoperative pause. 
Heart rate from 31 simulations were analyzed (1 missing), without a statistically 
significant result between simulations with or without a pause 
0.97(95%CI;0.94;1.00). Stait-Trait Anxiety Inventory score was calculated for 30 
simulations (2 missing), with no statistically significant change in self-assessed 
stress between simulations with or without pause 0.99(95%CI:0.89;1.09).  
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5 DISCUSSION 
The findings of the four studies included in this thesis implied that it can be 
complex to study intraoperative factors and non-technical skills in the operating 
room. But as intraoperative factors and non-technical skills are linked to outcome 
measures such as adverse events and thereby patient safety, it is important to 
continue studying them8 41 66 143. 
We found that the compliance to the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist was 
incomplete, both before and after the intervention. Only in 21% of the 1267 
checklists collected during the intervention-period all items were filled out. 
Although there was a high compliance to initiate the checklist, most times it was 
not performed the way it is intended, and often without checking all items. Other 
studies have also found a lack in the compliance to the Surgical Safety Checklist, 
where the checklist most times was initiated but not completed, described as 
contributing to a false sense of security114-116. Barriers to effective use of the 
checklist seems to be complex and multifactorial116. Involving the operating team, 
engaging senior personnel who show their support, and continuous education 
with reminders of barriers to the correct use of the checklist before, during and 
after the implementation seems to be important120 144. Additionally, the 
compliance to the checklist has been reported to be better when surgeons led 
them106 120. Although efforts were made to involve the operating team in the 
intervention of the revised Surgical Safety Checklist, it was not enough; it is 
possible that more time, more education, the involvement of senior key-persons, 
and the implementation led by a surgeon would have changed the results, since 
the study participants’ perception of the revised checklist was positive. 
Previous research has reported that high compliance to the Surgical Safety 
Checklist increased patient safety. In addition, a more thorough information 
about the surgical procedure and patient should be beneficial, which we could not 
demonstrate in our study. Presumably, the intervention dose was too small, but 
even so, how do we know that we measured what we intended to measure? Did 
the responses in the SAQ post-intervention reflect the domain perception of 
management, which significantly decreased between the two measurements? We 
did also note a decrease in the scores for the domains ‘Job satisfaction’ and 
‘Working conditions’, although not significant, which might imply that study 
participants were more dissatisfied with their job situation at the time for post-
intervention measurements. This also demonstrated the complexity of measuring 
interventions in the complex surgical environment.   
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As part of the intervention, the added item ‘description of the surgical procedure’ 
to the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist had many aspects and possible benefits. 
One aspect was that it would provide a better basis for both an individual’s 
situational awareness and the team’s shared mental model, as all professions of 
the operating team had the same information regarding the patient and the 
surgical procedure. Situation awareness and the shared mental model is about the 
ability for the operating team or a professional of the team, to be one step ahead, 
to anticipate events and their consequences and create alternative solutions to 
avoid adverse events and increase patient safety.  
One of the reasons that the Surgical Safety Checklist is important for team 
communication, is the fact that team members need to respond to the different 
items, and thereby communicate with closed-loops8 64. The shared mental model 
within the team has been reported to be improved through team planning145 and 
situational awareness has been identified as important for a surgeons technical 
skills146. The ‘description of the surgical procedure’ could also be of importance 
for the scrub nurse who constantly has to know what is going on in the operating 
room and assess the progress of the surgical procedure to be able to ‘think ahead 
of the surgeon’57.   
We found that the team members had different perception of communication 
and collaboration within the operating team, and physicians scored higher 
regarding teamwork climate than did nurses, both before and after the 
intervention. This is in line with results from earlier studies147 148. This result might 
be important as it implies that the safety climate among different members of the 
operating team may vary. In the introduction the importance of recognition of 
other team members roles were described, the professions among the operating 
team have different sub-goals, the same thing applies to the sub-teams. It is 
somewhat worrisome that the two professions included in the scrubbed sub team 
have different views of communication and teamwork. Not get understanding for 
one’s own sub-goals or understand others may lead to a feeling of being 
misunderstood and undervalued, which might result in impaired teamwork and 
negative stress.  
In two studies we saw basically the same result, where the study participants’ 
perception of intraoperative pauses was positive. The intraoperative pause routine 
was introduced at our operating ward in 2013, today (seven years later) the routine 
is still frequently practiced, which could mean that the pause routine is here to 
stay.  
Apart from the possible benefit of preventing fatigue before it is evident, the 
intraoperative pause routine could have other benefits. During complex surgery 
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or in combination with intraoperative difficulties or complications a pause routine 
could also give the surgeon a minute to regain cognitive self-control and re-assess 
the situation before leading others through a stressful situation, which have been 
earlier described84 149. During introduction of the intraoperative pause routine, the 
surgeons were encouraged to take a break after a major adverse event or when 
hesitating regarding the surgical strategy, and some of the surgeons stated that 
they sometimes had changed surgical strategy after a pause.    
Among the open-ended questions there were comments that the surgeon during 
the longer pause had worked out a new surgical strategy, which is positive. 
Therefore, another positive addition to the longer paus could have been to add a 
‘Time out’ before starting to operate again, where all members of the operating 
team get the possibility to understand the surgical plan, and for the team to have 
a shared mental model. The idea of making the pause routine mandatory and even 
more structured, where the surgeons before entering the operating room for a 
long surgical procedure had a plan for when taking a longer break could be 
beneficial. 
Even though one could argue that the surgeons’ experiences of the pause routine 
should be sufficient to promote the routine, we suspected that it would be easier 
to implement the pause routine if we could demonstrate that the surgeons’ 
perceptions was positive together with objective measurements on stress 
reduction. But we could not demonstrate a significant reduction in either of the 
parameters salivary cortisol, heart rate, or the Stait-Trait Anxiety Inventory to 
assess surgeons stress levels in the experimental study. It is possible that the 
simulations performed were not stressful enough for the surgeons included in the 
study, or that the intervention with a three minute long intraoperative pause 
including a sugar containing drink was not sufficient to show a significant 
difference between pause vs. no pause. It is also possible that our sample size 
calculation was inaccurate. When calculating the sample size, we used results from 
a study with comparisons between non-stressful and stressful operations 
(reduction in salivary cortisol from 3.60 – 2.95 (35%))137, our results showed 8% 
reductions in cortisol. Since the Imperial Stress Assessment Tool135 previously has 
shown correlations between salivary cortisol, heart rate and the Stait-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory when measuring stress in a surgical environment, one could assume 
that one of the alternatives mentioned above or a combination of them explains 
our result.  
The results from the domain stress recognition in the Safety Attitude 
Questionnaire implies that the residents and surgeons included in study IV were 
more aware of the influence stress can have on their performance median (IQR) 
62.5 (23.44), than the doctors participating in study II were, mean (SD) 76-74 
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(16.8-14). This implies that the participants in study IV were interested in the 
research question and in preventing intraoperative stress and fatigue.  
Except from trying to objectively measure reduction in intraoperative stress, study 
IV is important as it raises the awareness of intraoperative stress as an issue. To 
study stress among surgeons, who sometimes have reported that stress affects 
others more than themselves45 85 is one way to raise awareness of that stress is a 
factor that may affect their performance and subsequently the outcome of an 
operation.  
When operating team members are influenced by negative stress or working in a 
non-functioning team, it would be easier to make mistakes that could lead to 
adverse events and thereby decreased patient safety. Individuals who feel the 
support from other team members, and who have a shared mental model, and 
have handled stressful events together in the past, are better equipped to cope 
with stress in the future64 96. This is one reason to work with the compliance to 
the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist and why it is important to find ways to reduce 
stress among members of the operating team.  
Preoperative planning, an open climate, respect for each other, and improved 
communication and teamwork were mentioned as important for high patient 
safety, and the intra-operative pause routine was perceived to lead to better 
communication and teamwork, therefore it is reasonable to deduct that a pause 
routine may be of importance for patient safety.  
The pause routine could also lead to better focus on the operations by all 
professions, which was stated as an important aspect of patient safety.  In study 
II many surgeons identified coffee breaks during surgery as unnecessary 
disruptions, suggestions were made to arrange a more flexible system for intra-
operative pauses and lunchbreaks, including all professions in the operating team. 
In the operating rooms that we studied in study I, all members of the operating 
team except from the surgeons had scheduled coffee- and lunch breaks. By 
expanding the pause routine to include the entire operating team surgeons might 
experience fewer intraoperative disruptions which could also be beneficial for 
patient safety150-153.  This would also enable continuity among the operating team 
during the entire surgical procedure.  
We established correlations between intraoperative difficulties and complications 
and surgeons’ technical satisfaction with a surgical procedure. Earlier surgeons 
have reported that technical difficulties were a stressor in the operating room85 95. 
Problems within the operating team were also perceived as very stressful95 154. 
Another association between surgeon satisfaction and intraoperative teamwork is 
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that effective teams have been reported to have fewer miner problems, better 
intraoperative performance and shorter operating times155. Associations between 
major problems and intraoperative performance, teamwork and number of minor 
problems were also reported155. This may be related to disruptive behavior in the 
operating room, as one could suspect that a dissatisfied surgeon would be more 
prone to show disruptive behavior than a satisfied surgeon would. Disruptive 
behavior has been reported to increase stress and frustration within the operating 
team, which can influence communication and collaboration among team 
members156. Some of the nurses in study I wrote in the open-ended question that 
an intraoperative pause reduced disruptive behavior. 
It would be of interest to explore possible relationships between technical 
difficulties, surgeons’ satisfaction, intraoperative teamwork and stress reduction 
through intraoperative pauses. It may be that many of the factors and non-
technical skills studied in this thesis are bound to each other in a circle; for 
example, fewer surgical complications and difficulties leads to a more satisfied 
surgeon that could lead to better teamwork, which might lead to a beneficial work 
environment, with less stress and fatigue. But could it begin in the other end of 
the circle by reducing stressors in the operating room or by learning to manage 
stress and fatigue, which might lead to a better work environment, which could 
promote teamwork with high quality, a satisfied surgeon and fewer intraoperative 
complications and difficulties.    
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6 CONCLUSION 
An intraoperative pause routine was perceived as positive by both the operating 
surgeon and from the operating team. The positive experience was present during 
surgical procedures and simulated operations. The implemented pause routine did 
not lengthen the operating time and was perceived to increase teamwork, 
communication and patient safety. Intraoperative teamwork and communication 
among operating team members were estimated as important for patient safety. 
The impact on patient safety, for example, as effect on adverse events or 
complications remains to be studied. With this in mind, a mandatory pause 
routine during long surgical procedures with short pauses including a sugar-
containing drink every other hour or after adverse events or complications, and 
shorter lunch breaks after four hours of surgery could be introduced.  
Surgeons were more satisfied with a surgical procedure when the number of 
intraoperative difficulties and complications were low. This is interesting, as 
satisfaction appears to reflect problems in the operating room. Perhaps the 
association between a satisfied surgeon, surgical performance and teamwork 
could benefit from further exploration of an association between a satisfied 
surgeon and his/her ability to cope with stress. 
Introducing new routines are difficult and the compliance to the WHO Surgical 
Safety Checklist was unsatisfactory. Education of the operating team together 
with a revised checklist did not change teamwork climate. This may be due to an 
insufficient intervention dose. To reach high compliance to the Surgical Safety 
Checklist, ongoing education and further education of the operating team is 
important. Perhaps more focus on the effects that the WHO Surgical Safety 
Checklist has on outcomes could be one way of addressing an increased use? As 
the operating team had different perceptions of teamwork and communication, it 
would be interesting to study differences in teamwork and communication 
between operating teams who shift from day to day with more coherent operating 
teams.   
As well as enhancing team communication, the use of the WHO Surgical Safety 
Checklist could contribute to a possibly raised awareness of the importance of 
safety issues among front-line personnel in the operating room. Therefor one 
could assume that by studying the operating teams’ non-technical skills their 
attitudes to safety concerns might be more prominent, hence rendering a safer 
surgical environment. The same thing could be applied when studying 
intraoperative stress; it makes the study participants more aware of the effects 
stress may have on the intraoperative performance.  
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7 FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 
The findings of these studies imply that it is complex to study intraoperative 
factors and non-technical skills in the operating room, and even more complex to 
assess their outcomes. But since adverse events from surgical care may be severe 
and can lead to additional interventions or treatments, disability, prolonged 
hospital stay, and more outpatient visit it would seem important to try avoid 
adverse events as far as possible. One way of doing that is by continuing to study 
intraoperative factors and non-technical skills that affect surgical outcome and 
patient safety.   
My aspiration is that the results of this thesis might inspire some management, 
operating teams and personnel working in operating teams to learn more about 
the importance of non-technical skills. This may take the form of teambuilding in 
the workplace, by discussing non-technical skills among the operating team, by 
listening to the front-line workers’ experiences regarding non-technical skills, by 
having journal clubs on the subjects, or even at informal coffee breaks.  
In some high-risk organizations, non-technical skills is a natural part of the 
education. Health care has traditionally been late with the acknowledgement of 
the importance of good non-technical skills for safe care. One goal with this thesis 
was to illustrate the subject of non-technical skills in surgical care. A vision for 
the future is to continue exploring the different aspects of non-technical skills 
among the operating team. Interesting questions to study could be: What non-
technical skills are important for the different professions in the operating team? 
What non-technical skills are a shared common ground for the entire operating 
team? What non-technical skills are of most importance to avoid adverse events 
and increase patient safety? Which stressors are more difficult to coop with? How 
do we prevent negative stress in the operating room? 
 43 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
This thesis would not have been possible if it wasn’t for the people guiding and 
inspiring me. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my family, friends 
and co-workers who have contributed to this thesis.  
Special thanks to:   
Eva Angenete, main supervisor, for taking me in as your doctoral student, for 
your support, guidance, encouragement, and your belief in that I could do this. 
You are a great inspiration to me, both as a researcher and as a surgeon. Looking 
forward to scrub in with you in the future.  
Eva Haglind, co-supervisor and head of the research unit SSORG – 
Scandinavian, Surgical Outcomes Research Group. Thank you for your invaluable 
support, generosity, wisdom, and many advises regarding life in general and 
research in specific.   
Annette Erichsen Andersson, co-supervisor, dear colleague, roommate, and 
friend. Thank you for all you have taught me, and for being an inspiration, as a 
researcher, lector and as a scrub nurse.    
David Bock, your endless patience and support when discussing study designs 
or explaining statistics for me are impressive and priceless.  
Friends and former doctoral students at SSORG Adiela Correa, Jennifer Park 
and Jacob Gehrman, thank you for all the laughs and for letting me pick your 
brains at any time.   
To my co-workers at SSORG, Carolina, Annelie, Jane, Ingrid, Elisabeth, 
Carina, Anette W, Anette E, and to the doctoral students at SSORG Andreas, 
Anna, Sofie, Aron, Daniel, Josefin, Jenny, David, Sophia, Sofia for your 
friendship, support, encouragement, and for all the laughter and conversations in 
the lunch room. 
To Malin Ragnmark Ek, head of the Surgical Department, SU/Östra and to 
Mattias Block, head of the Colorectal Unit, SU/Östra, thank you for always 
being supportive and letting me use your surgeons as study participants.  
To Ingmari, Elisabeth and Linn, present managers of Op 1, SU/Östra. To 
Karin Hansson, former manager of Op 1, SU/Östra thank you for letting me 
take time of as a scrub nurse, and for letting me conduct studies at our 
department. Thank you for fighting for the future of our profession.  
 44 
To my colleagues at the University of Gothenburg, and particularly to my 
colleagues at the education for specialist nurses in operating room nursing, 
Annette and Monica. Thank you for welcoming me into your team, and for 
guiding me as a novice university adjunct. To Helena Wigert, associate professor 
and head of the section Diagnostics, Acute and Critical Care at Sahlgrenska 
Academy at University of Gothenburg, thank you for your support in finishing 
my doctoral studies.   
“Laget” at the Operating ward 1, at Sahlgrenska University Hospital/Östra. 
Thank you for all the weekends working side by side with you. Looking forward 
to work more closely with you again. 
To my colleague scrub nurses, Marie, Sara, Susanne. What an honor it is to have 
great friends like you to work with, discuss intraoperative care with, and to laugh 
with. 
To all personnel, scrub nurses, the colorectal team, and the robotic team at Op 1, 
SU/Östra, it is a joy working with you. See you soon! 
To my extended family, Karin, Martin, Ivar, Svea and Edit, thank you for taking 
me in (in good times and in bad times) and letting me be who I am, and for loving 
Margit. Love you all! 
To järngänget: Josefine, Johanna, Karin, Lovisa, your advices regarding all 
things in life are priceless. 
To my family. My mom Gunilla and dad Urban, for all your support and 
unconditional love during my upbringing as well as now, and thank you for being 
awesome grandparents. To my siblings and co-house owners Anders and Karin, 
thank you for your love and company, for supporting me, and for your 
engagement in your niece. I love you! To my fluffy cats Saga and Tyson for 
showing me how to relax. Finally, to my wonderful daughter Margit, for making 
life magnificent by just being who you are. Your patience when waiting for your 
mom to finish writing on the computer is truly impressive. I love you ♥  
 
 
 
 45 
REFERENCES 
1. Weiser TG, Regenbogen SE, Thompson KD, et al. An estimation of the global 
volume of surgery: a modelling strategy based on available data. Lancet 
(London, England) 2008;372(9633):139-44. doi: 10.1016/s0140-
6736(08)60878-8 [published Online First: 2008/06/28] 
2. Socialstyrelsen. Statistik om operationer och behandlingar i specialistvård 2019 
[Available from: https://www.socialstyrelsen.se/statistik-och-
data/statistik/statistikamnen/operationer-och-behandlingar/ accessed 
200520 2020. 
3. Sveriges Riksdag. Hälso- och sjukvårdslag (2017:30) 2020 [Available from: 
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-
forfattningssamling/halso--och-sjukvardslag_sfs-2017-30 accessed 200424 
2020. 
4. Sveriges Riksdag. Patientsäkerhetslag (2010:659) 2020 [Available from: 
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-
forfattningssamling/patientsakerhetslag-2010659_sfs-2010-659 accessed 
200424 2020. 
5. Svensk sjuksköterskeförening, Svenska Läkaresällskapet. Teamarbete & 
Förbättringskunskap -två kärnkompetenser för god och säker vård. Solna, 
2017. 
6. Svensk sjuksköterskeförening, Svenska Läkaresällskapet, Fysioterapeuterna, 
Sveriges Arbetsterapeuter, Dietisternas Riksförbund, Sveriges 
Tandläkarförbund. Säker vård – en kärnkompetens för vårdens samtliga 
professioner. Solna, 2016. 
7. World Health Organization. Patient Safety 2020 [Available from: 
https://www.who.int/patientsafety/en/ accessed 200423 2020. 
8. Haynes AB, Weiser TG, Berry WR, et al. A surgical safety checklist to reduce 
morbidity and mortality in a global population. N Engl J Med 
2009;360(5):491-9. doi: 10.1056/NEJMsa0810119 [published Online First: 
2009/01/16] 
9. Haugen AS, Softeland E, Almeland SK, et al. Effect of the World Health 
Organization checklist on patient outcomes: a stepped wedge cluster 
randomized controlled trial. Ann Surg 2015;261(5):821-8. doi: 
10.1097/sla.0000000000000716 [published Online First: 2014/05/16] 
10. Ramsay G, Haynes AB, Lipsitz SR, et al. Reducing surgical mortality in 
Scotland by use of the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist. Br J Surg 2019 doi: 
10.1002/bjs.11151 [published Online First: 2019/04/18] 
11. Borchard A, Schwappach DL, Barbir A, et al. A systematic review of the 
effectiveness, compliance, and critical factors for implementation of safety 
checklists in surgery. Ann Surg 2012;256(6):925-33. doi: 
10.1097/SLA.0b013e3182682f27 [published Online First: 2012/09/13] 
 46 
12. Goras C, Olin K, Unbeck M, et al. Tasks, multitasking and interruptions 
among the surgical team in an operating room: a prospective observational 
study. BMJ Open 2019;9(5):e026410. doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-026410 
[published Online First: 2019/05/18] 
13. Singer S, Lin S, Falwell A, et al. Relationship of safety climate and safety 
performance in hospitals. Health Serv Res 2009;44(2 Pt 1):399-421. doi: 
10.1111/j.1475-6773.2008.00918.x [published Online First: 2009/01/31] 
14. Hoffmann B, Rohe J. Patient safety and error management: what causes 
adverse events and how can they be prevented? Dtsch Arztebl Int 
2010;107(6):92. doi: 10.3238/arztebl.2010.0092 
15. Brooke BS, Dominici F, Pronovost PJ, et al. Variations in surgical outcomes 
associated with hospital compliance with safety practices. Surgery 
2012;151(5):651-9. doi: 10.1016/j.surg.2011.12.001 
16. Mazzocco K, Petitti DB, Fong KT, et al. Surgical team behaviors and patient 
outcomes. Am J Surg 2009;197(5):678-85. doi: 
10.1016/j.amjsurg.2008.03.002 
17. Pfandler M, Stefan P, Mehren C, et al. Technical and Non-Technical Skills in 
Surgery: A Simulated Operating Room Environment Study. Spine 2019 doi: 
10.1097/brs.0000000000003154 [published Online First: 2019/07/26] 
18. McCulloch P, Mishra A, Handa A, et al. The effects of aviation-style non-
technical skills training on technical performance and outcome in the 
operating theatre. Qual Saf Health Care 2009;18(2):109-15. doi: 
10.1136/qshc.2008.032045 
19. Mavros MN, Bohnen JD, Ramly EP, et al. Intraoperative Adverse Events: 
Risk Adjustment for Procedure Complexity and Presence of Adhesions Is 
Crucial. J Am Coll Surg 2015;221(2):345-53. doi: 
10.1016/j.jamcollsurg.2015.03.045 [published Online First: 2015/07/05] 
20. Johansson V, Vogelsang A-C. Patient reported extremity symptoms after 
robot-assisted laparoscopic cystectomy. J Clin Nurse 2019;28 doi: 
10.1111/jocn.14781 
21. Tanner J, Woodings D, Moncaster K. Preoperative hair removal to reduce 
surgical site infection. Cochrane Database Syst Rev 2006(2):Cd004122. doi: 
10.1002/14651858.CD004122.pub2 [published Online First: 2006/04/21] 
22. Tschannen D, Bates O, Talsma A, et al. Patient-specific and Surgical 
Characteristics in the Development of Pressure Ulcers. Am J Crit Care 
2012;21(2):116-25. doi: 10.4037/ajcc2012716 
23. Aronovitch SA. Intraoperatively acquired pressure ulcer prevalence: a national 
study. J of WOCN 1999;26(3):130-6. doi: 10.1016/s1071-5754(99)90030-x 
[published Online First: 2000/03/11] 
24. Siu J, Maran N, Paterson-Brown S. Observation of behavioural markers of 
non-technical skills in the operating room and their relationship to intra-
operative incidents. Surgeon 2016;14(3):119-28. doi: 
10.1016/j.surge.2014.06.005 [published Online First: 2014/07/16] 
 47 
25. de Vries EN, Ramrattan MA, Smorenburg SM, et al. The incidence and nature 
of in-hospital adverse events: a systematic review. Qual Saf Health Care 
2008;17(3):216-23. doi: 10.1136/qshc.2007.023622 [published Online 
First: 2008/06/04] 
26. Thomas EJ, Studdert DM, Burstin HR, et al. Incidence and Types of Adverse 
Events and Negligent Care in Utah and Colorado. Medical Care 
2000;38(3):261-71. 
27. Howell A-M, Panesar SS, Burns EM, et al. Reducing the Burden of Surgical 
Harm: A Systematic Review of the Interventions Used to Reduce Adverse 
Events in Surgery. Ann Surg 2014;259(4):630-41. doi: 
10.1097/sla.0000000000000371 
28. World Health Organization. WHO Safe Surgery 2020 [Available from: 
https://www.who.int/patientsafety/topics/safe-surgery/en/ accessed 
200403 2020. 
29. LÖF. Statistik 2019 - hela Sverige 2020 [Available from: https://lof.se/wp-
content/uploads/Statistik-2019-Hela-Sverige.pdf accessed 200319. 
30. Haglind E, Carlsson S, Stranne J, et al. Urinary Incontinence and Erectile 
Dysfunction After Robotic Versus Open Radical Prostatectomy: A 
Prospective, Controlled, Nonrandomised Trial. Eur Urol 2015;68(2):216-
25. doi: 10.1016/j.eururo.2015.02.029 [published Online First: 
2015/03/17] 
31. Prytz M, Angenete E, Ekelund J, et al. Extralevator abdominoperineal excision 
(ELAPE) for rectal cancer-short-term results from the Swedish Colorectal 
Cancer Registry. Selective use of ELAPE warranted. Int J Colorectal Dis 
2014;29(8):981. doi: 10.1007/s00384-014-1932-9 
32. Bonjer HJ, Deijen CL, Abis GA, et al. A Randomized Trial of Laparoscopic 
versus Open Surgery for Rectal Cancer. N Engl J Med 2015;372(14):1324-
32. doi: 10.1056/NEJMoa1414882 
33. Block M, Börjesson L, Lindholm E, et al. Pouch design and long-term 
functional outcome after ileal pouch-anal anastomosis. Br J Surg 
2009;96(5):527-32. doi: 10.1002/bjs.6590 
34. Smits M, Zegers M, Groenewegen PP, et al. Exploring the causes of adverse 
events in hospitals and potential prevention strategies. Qual Saf Health Care 
2010;19(5):e5. doi: 10.1136/qshc.2008.030726 [published Online First: 
2010/02/10] 
35. Zegers M, de Bruijne MC, de Keizer B, et al. The incidence, root-causes, and 
outcomes of adverse events in surgical units: implication for potential 
prevention strategies. Patient Saf Surg 2011;5:13. doi: 10.1186/1754-9493-
5-13 [published Online First: 2011/05/24] 
36. Benn J, Koutantji M, Wallace L, et al. Feedback from incident reporting: 
information and action to improve patient safety. Qual Saf Health Care 
2009;18(1):11-21. doi: 10.1136/qshc.2007.024166 [published Online First: 
2009/02/11] 
 48 
37. de Vries EN, Prins HA, Crolla RM, et al. Effect of a comprehensive surgical 
safety system on patient outcomes. N Engl J Med 2010;363(20):1928-37. 
doi: 10.1056/NEJMsa0911535 [published Online First: 2010/11/12] 
38. Awad SS, Fagan SP, Bellows C, et al. Bridging the communication gap in the 
operating room with medical team training. Am J Surg 2005;190(5):770-4. 
doi: 10.1016/j.amjsurg.2005.07.018 [published Online First: 2005/10/18] 
39. Mearns K, Flin R. Assessing the state of organizational safety—culture or 
climate? Curr Psychol 1999;18(1):5-17. doi: 10.1007/s12144-999-1013-3 
40. The Health Foundation. Measuring Safety Culture 2020 [Available from: 
https://www.health.org.uk/publications/measuring-safety-culture 
accessed 200425 2020. 
41. Haynes AB, Weiser TG, Berry WR, et al. Changes in safety attitude and 
relationship to decreased postoperative morbidity and mortality following 
implementation of a checklist-based surgical safety intervention. BMJ Qual 
Saf 2011;20(1):102-7. doi: 10.1136/bmjqs.2009.040022 [published Online 
First: 2011/01/14] 
42. Ford J, Henderson R, O'Hare D. The effects of Crew Resource Management 
(CRM) training on flight attendants' safety attitudes. J Saf Res 2014;48:49-
56. doi: 10.1016/j.jsr.2013.11.003 
43. Kuy S, Romero RAL. Improving staff perception of a safety climate with crew 
resource management training. J Surg Res 2017;213:177. doi: 
10.1016/j.jss.2016.04.013 
44. Paine LA, Rosenstein BJ, Sexton JB, et al. Assessing and improving safety 
culture throughout an academic medical centre: a prospective cohort study. 
Qual Saf Health Care 2010;19(6):547-54. doi: 10.1136/qshc.2009.039347 
45. Sexton JB, Thomas EJ, Helmreich RL. Error, stress, and teamwork in 
medicine and aviation: cross sectional surveys. BMJ 2000;320(7237):745-
49. 
46. Helmreich R, Merrit A, Wilhelm J. The Evolution of Crew Resource 
Management Training in Commercial Aviation. Int J Aviat Psychol ;9(1), 19-
32 
47. Helmreich R. Culture at work in aviation and medicine : national, 
organizational and professional influences. London : Routledge 2016. 
48. International ergonomics association. What is ergonomics? 2020 [Available 
from: https://iea.cc/what-is-ergonomics/ accessed 200428 2020. 
49. Reason J. Human error: models and management. BMJ (Clinical research ed) 
2000;320(7237):768-70. [published Online First: 2000/03/17] 
50. Vincent C, Taylor-Adams S, Chapman EJ, et al. How to investigate and 
analyse clinical incidents: clinical risk unit and association of litigation and 
risk management protocol. BMJ (Clinical research ed) 2000;320(7237):777-81. 
doi: 10.1136/bmj.320.7237.777 [published Online First: 2000/03/17] 
51. Ödegård S. Patientsäkerhet : teori och praktik. 1. uppl. ed. Stockholm: 
Stockholm : Liber 2013. 
 49 
52. Socialstyrelsen. Patientsäkerhetslagen, 2020 [Available from: 
https://patientsakerhet.socialstyrelsen.se/lagar-och-foreskrifter/centrala-
lagar/patientsakerhetslagen/ accessed 200424 2020. 
53. Dekker S. HE, Woods D., Cook R. Resilience Engineering: New directions 
for measuring and maintaining safety in complex systems 2008 [Available 
from: 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Erik_Hollnagel/publication/2386
87807_Resilience_Engineering_New_directions_for_measuring_and_mai
ntaining_safety_in_complex_systems/links/0046353148e497e765000000.
pdf accessed 200428 2020. 
54. Wakeman D, Langham MR. Creating a safer operating room: Groups, team 
dynamics and crew resource management principles. Sem Pediatr Surg 
2018;27(2):107-13. doi: 10.1053/j.sempedsurg.2018.02.008 
55. Riksföreningen för anestesi och intensivvård, Svensk Sjuksköterskeförening. 
Kompetensbeskrivning legitimerad sjuksköterska med 
specialistsjuksköterskeexamen med inriktning mot anestesivård 2019 
[Available from: https://www.swenurse.se/Sa-tycker-
vi/publikationer/Kompetensbeskrivningar-och-
riktlinjer/Specialistsjukskoterska-inom-anestesisjukvard/ accessed 200427 
2020. 
56. Socialstyrelsen. Läkarnas specialiseringstjänstgöring 2008 [Available from: 
https://www.socialstyrelsen.se/globalassets/sharepoint-
dokument/artikelkatalog/foreskrifter-och-allmanna-rad/2008-126-
2_20081263.pdf accessed 200427 2020. 
57. Mitchell L, Flin R. Non-technical skills of the operating theatre scrub nurse: 
literature review. J Adv Nurs 2008;63(1):15-24. doi: 10.1111/j.1365-
2648.2008.04695.x [published Online First: 2008/07/05] 
58. Riksföreningen för operationssjukvård, Svensk Sjuksköterskeförening. 
Kompetensbeskrivning för legitimerad sjuksköterska med 
specialistsjuksköterskeexamen inriktning mot operationssjukvård 2011 
[Available from: 
http://www.rfop.se/media/5phhwhho/kompbeskrivning.pdf accessed 
200427 2020. 
59. von Vogelsang A-C, Swenne CL, Gustafsson BÅ, et al. Operating theatre 
nurse specialist competence to ensure patient safety in the operating 
theatre: A discursive paper. Nurs Open;n/a(n/a) doi: 10.1002/nop2.424 
60. Parker SH, Yule S, Flin R, et al. Surgeons' leadership in the operating room: 
an observational study. Am J Surg 2012;204(3):347-54. doi: 
10.1016/j.amjsurg.2011.03.009 [published Online First: 2011/12/20] 
61. Rydenfält C, Johansson G, Odenrick P, et al. Distributed leadership in the 
operating room: a naturalistic observation study. Cogn Technol Work 
2015;17(3):451-60. doi: 10.1007/s10111-014-0316-9 
 50 
62. Quality and Safety Education for Nurses. QSEN Competencies 2020 
[Available from: https://qsen.org/competencies/pre-licensure-ksas/ 
accessed 200428 2020. 
63. Undre S, Sevdalis N, Healey AN, et al. Teamwork in the operating theatre: 
Cohesion or confusion? J Eval Clin Pract 2006;12(2):182-89. doi: 
10.1111/j.1365-2753.2006.00614.x 
64. Flin RH, O'Connor P, Crichton MD. Safety at the sharp end: a guide to non-
technical skills. Burlington, VT; Aldershot, England: Ashgate 2008. 
65. Cooper WO, Spain DA, Guillamondegui O, et al. Association of Coworker 
Reports About Unprofessional Behavior by Surgeons With Surgical 
Complications in Their Patients. JAMA surgery 2019 doi: 
10.1001/jamasurg.2019.1738 [published Online First: 2019/06/20] 
66. Fecso AB, Kuzulugil SS, Babaoglu C, et al. Relationship between 
intraoperative non-technical performance and technical events in bariatric 
surgery. Br J Surg 2018;105(8):1044-50. doi: 10.1002/bjs.10811 [published 
Online First: 2018/03/31] 
67. Online Etymology Dictionary. Communication  [Available from: 
https://www.etymonline.com/word/communication accessed 200429 
2020. 
68. Weldon SM, Korkiakangas T, Bezemer J, et al. Communication in the 
operating theatre. Br J Surg 2013;100(13):1677-88. doi: 10.1002/bjs.9332 
69. Torring B, Gittell JH, Laursen M, et al. Communication and relationship 
dynamics in surgical teams in the operating room: an ethnographic study. 
BMC Health Serv Res 2019;19(1):528. doi: 10.1186/s12913-019-4362-0 
[published Online First: 2019/07/31] 
70. Lingard L, Espin S, Whyte S, et al. Communication failures in the operating 
room: An observational classification of recurrent types and effects. Qual 
Saf Health Care 2004;13(5):330-34. doi: 10.1136/qshc.2003.008425 
71. Hunter H, Tara C, Wesley C, et al. Assessing SBAR during intraoperative 
handoff. Perioper Care Oper Room Manag 2017;6(C):7-10. doi: 
10.1016/j.pcorm.2016.12.004 
72. Salas E, Cooke NJ, Rosen MA. On Teams, Teamwork, and Team 
Performance: Discoveries and Developments. Hum Factors 2008;50(3):540-
47. doi: 10.1518/001872008x288457 
73. Erestam S, Haglind E, Bock D, et al. Changes in safety climate and teamwork 
in the operating room after implementation of a revised WHO checklist: a 
prospective interventional study. Patient Saf Surg 2017;11:4. doi: 
10.1186/s13037-017-0120-6 [published Online First: 2017/02/07] 
74. Carney BT, West P, Neily J, et al. Differences in nurse and surgeon 
perceptions of teamwork: implications for use of a briefing checklist in the 
OR. Aorn j 2010;91(6):722-9. doi: 10.1016/j.aorn.2009.11.066 [published 
Online First: 2010/06/01] 
 51 
75. Wauben LS, Dekker-van Doorn CM, van Wijngaarden JD, et al. Discrepant 
perceptions of communication, teamwork and situation awareness among 
surgical team members. Int J Qual Health Care 2011;23(2):159-66. doi: 
10.1093/intqhc/mzq079 [published Online First: 2011/01/19] 
76. Druskat VU, Pescosolido AT. The Content of Effective Teamwork Mental 
Models in Self-Managing Teams: Ownership, Learning and Heedful 
Interrelating. Hum Relat 2002;55(3):283-314. doi: 
10.1177/0018726702553001 
77. Lazarus RS. Stress, appraisal, and coping. New York: New York : Springer 
1984. 
78. Hassan I, Weyers P, Maschuw K, et al. Negative stress-coping strategies 
among novices in surgery correlate with poor virtual laparoscopic 
performance. Br J Surg 2006;93(12):1554-9. doi: 10.1002/bjs.5544 
[published Online First: 2006/10/21] 
79. Bradford Cannon B. Bodily shanges in pain, hunger, fear, and rage. New York: 
Appelton-Century-Crofts 1915. 
80. Dhabhar FS. The short-term stress response - Mother nature's mechanism for 
enhancing protection and performance under conditions of threat, 
challenge, and opportunity. Front Neuroendocrin 2018;49:175-92. doi: 
10.1016/j.yfrne.2018.03.004 [published Online First: 2018/03/30] 
81. Dhabhar FS, McEwen BS. Acute stress enhances while chronic stress 
suppresses cell-mediated immunity in vivo: a potential role for leukocyte 
trafficking. Brain Behav Immun 1997;11(4):286-306. doi: 
10.1006/brbi.1997.0508 [published Online First: 1998/03/26] 
82. Mumaw R. The effects of stress on nuclear power plant operational decision 
making and training approaches to reduce stress effects. 1994 doi: 
10.2172/10175955 
83. Robson TM.  [Available from: 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a605157.pdf. 
84. Arora S, Sevdalis N, Nestel D, et al. Managing intraoperative stress: what do 
surgeons want from a crisis training program? Am J Surg 2009;197(4):537-
43. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amjsurg.2008.02.009 
85. Arora S, Sevdalis N, Nestel D, et al. The impact of stress on surgical 
performance: a systematic review of the literature. Surgery 2010;147(3):318-
30, 30 e1-6. doi: 10.1016/j.surg.2009.10.007 [published Online First: 
2009/12/17] 
86. Anton NE, Montero PN, Howley LD, et al. What stress coping strategies are 
surgeons relying upon during surgery? Am J Surg 2015;210(5):846-51. doi: 
10.1016/j.amjsurg.2015.04.002 [published Online First: 2015/05/23] 
87. Driskell JE, Salas E, Johnston J. Does stress lead to a loss of team perspective? 
Group Dyn Theory Res Pract 1999;3(4):291-302. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1089-2699.3.4.291 
 52 
88. Wheelock A, Suliman A, Wharton R, et al. The impact of operating room 
distractions on stress, workload, and teamwork. Ann Surg 
2015;261(6):1079-84. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/SLA.0000000000001051 
89. Dawson D, Reid K. Fatigue, alcohol and performance impairment. Nature 
1997;388(6639):235-35. doi: 10.1038/40775 
90. Krueger GP. Sustained work, fatigue, sleep loss and performance: A review 
of the issues. Work Stress 1989;3(2):129-41. doi: 
10.1080/02678378908256939 
91. Whitmore J, Fisher S. Speech during sustained operations. Speech Commun 
1996;20(1-2):55-70. doi: 10.1016/S0167-6393(96)00044-1 
92. Pilcher JJ, Huffcutt AI. Effects of sleep deprivation on performance: a meta-
analysis. Sleep 1996;19(4):318-26. doi: 10.1093/sleep/19.4.318 [published 
Online First: 1996/05/01] 
93. Sonoda Y, Onozuka D, Hagihara A. Factors related to teamwork performance 
and stress of operating room nurses. J Nurs Manag 2018;26(1):66-73. doi: 
10.1111/jonm.12522 [published Online First: 2017/07/27] 
94. Gurman GM, Klein M, Weksler N. Professional stress in anesthesiology: a 
review. J Clin Monit Comput 2012;26(4):329-35. doi: 10.1007/s10877-011-
9328-7 [published Online First: 2011/12/20] 
95. Wetzel CM, Kneebone RL, Woloshynowych M, et al. The effects of stress on 
surgical performance. Am J Surg 2006;191(1):5-10. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amjsurg.2005.08.034 
96. Flin R, Shevels T. Sitting in the hot seat. In: Flin R, Shevels T, eds., 1999:87-
88. 
97. Arora S, Aggarwal R, Moran A, et al. Mental practice: effective stress 
management training for novice surgeons. J Am Coll Surg 2011;212(2):225-
33. 
98. Engelmann C, Schneider M, Kirschbaum C, et al. Effects of intraoperative 
breaks on mental and somatic operator fatigue: a randomized clinical trial. 
Surg Endosc 2011;25(4):1245-50. doi: 10.1007/s00464-010-1350-1 
[published Online First: 2010/09/14] 
99. Hallbeck MS, Lowndes BR, Bingener J, et al. The impact of intraoperative 
microbreaks with exercises on surgeons: A multi-center cohort study. Appl 
Ergon 2017;60:334-41. doi: 10.1016/j.apergo.2016.12.006 [published 
Online First: 2017/02/09] 
100. Nieman DC, Gillitt ND, Sha W, et al. Metabolomics-Based Analysis of 
Banana and Pear Ingestion on Exercise Performance and Recovery. J 
Proteome Res 2015;14(12):5367-77. doi: 10.1021/acs.jproteome.5b00909 
[published Online First: 2015/11/13] 
101. Rowlands DS, Houltham S, Musa-Veloso K, et al. Fructose-Glucose 
Composite Carbohydrates and Endurance Performance: Critical Review 
and Future Perspectives. Sports Med (Auckland, NZ) 2015;45(11):1561-76. 
doi: 10.1007/s40279-015-0381-0 [published Online First: 2015/09/17] 
 53 
102. Vandenbogaerde TJ, Hopkins WG. Effects of acute carbohydrate 
supplementation on endurance performance: a meta-analysis. Sports Med 
(Auckland, NZ) 2011;41(9):773-92. doi: 10.2165/11590520-000000000-
00000 [published Online First: 2011/08/19] 
103. Weiser TG, Haynes AB, Lashoher A, et al. Perspectives in quality: designing 
the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist. Int J Qual Health Care 2010;22(5):365-
70. doi: 10.1093/intqhc/mzq039 
104. World Health Organization. Implementation manual, Surgical Safety 
Checklist Geneva2008 [Available from: 
http://www.who.int/patientsafety/safesurgery/tools_resources/SSSL_
Manual_finalJun08.pdf?ua=12015. 
105. World Health Organization. WHO Surgical Safety Checklist Implementation 
2020 [Available from: https://www.who.int/patientsafety/topics/safe-
surgery/checklist_implementation/en/ accessed 200403 2020. 
106. Russ S, Rout S, Caris J, et al. Measuring variation in use of the WHO surgical 
safety checklist in the operating room: a multicenter prospective cross-
sectional study. J Am Coll Surg 2015;220(1):1-11 e4. doi: 
10.1016/j.jamcollsurg.2014.09.021 [published Online First: 2014/12/03] 
107. de Jager E, Gunnarsson R, Ho YH. Implementation of the World Health 
Organization Surgical Safety Checklist Correlates with Reduced Surgical 
Mortality and Length of Hospital Admission in a High-Income Country. 
World J Surg 2019;43(1):117-24. doi: 10.1007/s00268-018-4703-x 
[published Online First: 2018/06/28] 
108. Kim RY, Kwakye G, Kwok AC, et al. Sustainability and Long-term 
Effectiveness of the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist Combined With 
Pulse Oximetry in a Resource-Limited Setting: Two-Year Update From 
Moldova. JAMA surgery 2015;150(5):473-79. doi: 
10.1001/jamasurg.2014.3848 %J JAMA Surgery 
109. Lepänluoma M, Takala R, Kotkansalo A, et al. Surgical safety checklist is 
associated with improved operating room safety culture, reduced wound 
complications, and unplanned readmissions in a pilot study in 
neurosurgery. Scand J Surg 2014;103(1):66-72. doi: 
10.1177/1457496913482255 
110. de Jager E, Gunnarsson R, Ho YH. Implementation of the World Health 
Organization Surgical Safety Checklist Correlates with Reduced Surgical 
Mortality and Length of Hospital Admission in a High-Income Country. 
World J Surg 2018 doi: 10.1007/s00268-018-4703-x [published Online 
First: 2018/06/28] 
111. Gillespie BM, Chaboyer W, Thalib L, et al. Effect of using a safety checklist 
on patient complications after surgery: a systematic review and meta-
analysis. Anesthesiology 2014;120(6):1380-9. doi: 
10.1097/ALN.0000000000000232 
 54 
112. Abbott TEF, Ahmad T, Phull MK, et al. The surgical safety checklist and 
patient outcomes after surgery: a prospective observational cohort study, 
systematic review and meta-analysis. Br J Anaesth 2018;120(1):146-55. doi: 
10.1016/j.bja.2017.08.002 
113. Rodrigo‐Rincon I, Martin‐Vizcaino MP, Tirapu‐Leon B, et al. The effects of 
surgical checklists on morbidity and mortality: a pre‐ and post‐
intervention study. Acta Anaesthesiol Scand 2015;59(2):205-14. doi: 
10.1111/aas.12443 
114. Rydenfalt C, Ek A, Larsson PA. Safety checklist compliance and a false sense 
of safety: new directions for research. BMJ Qual Saf 2014;23(3):183-6. doi: 
10.1136/bmjqs-2013-002168 [published Online First: 2013/10/05] 
115. Rydenfalt C, Johansson G, Odenrick P, et al. Compliance with the WHO 
Surgical Safety Checklist: deviations and possible improvements. Int J 
Qual Health Care 2013;25(2):182-7. doi: 10.1093/intqhc/mzt004 
[published Online First: 2013/01/22] 
116. Fourcade A, Blache JL, Grenier C, et al. Barriers to staff adoption of a 
surgical safety checklist. BMJ Qual Saf 2012;21(3):191-7. doi: 
10.1136/bmjqs-2011-000094 [published Online First: 2011/11/10] 
117. Van Klei AW, Hoff GR, Van Aarnhem LEEH, et al. Effects of the 
Introduction of the WHO “Surgical Safety Checklist” on In-Hospital 
Mortality: A Cohort Study. Ann Surg 2012;255(1):44-49. doi: 
10.1097/SLA.0b013e31823779ae 
118. Sparks EA, Wehbe-Janek H, Johnson RL, et al. Surgical Safety Checklist 
Compliance: A Job Done Poorly. J Am Coll Surg 2013;217(5):867-73.e3. 
doi: 10.1016/j.jamcollsurg.2013.07.393 
119. Gagliardi AR, Straus SE, Shojania KG, et al. Multiple Interacting Factors 
Influence Adherence, and Outcomes Associated with Surgical Safety 
Checklists: A Qualitative Study. PLoS ONE 2014;9(9) doi: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0108585 
120. Gillespie BM, Marshall A. Implementation of safety checklists in surgery: a 
realist synthesis of evidence. Implement Sci IS 2015;10(1):137. doi: 
10.1186/s13012-015-0319-9 [published Online First: 2015/09/30] 
121. Conley DM, Singer SJ, Edmondson L, et al. Effective Surgical Safety 
Checklist Implementation. J Am Coll Surg 2011;212(5):873-79. doi: 
10.1016/j.jamcollsurg.2011.01.052 
122. Bergs J, Lambrechts F, Simons P, et al. Barriers and facilitators related to the 
implementation of surgical safety checklists: a systematic review of the 
qualitative evidence. BMJ Qual Saf 2015 doi: 10.1136/bmjqs-2015-
004021 [published Online First: 2015/07/23] 
123. Wæhle HV, Haugen AS, Wiig S, et al. How does the WHO Surgical Safety 
Checklist fit with existing perioperative risk management strategies? An 
ethnographic study across surgical specialties. BMC health services research 
2020;20(1):111. doi: 10.1186/s12913-020-4965-5 [published Online First: 
2020/02/14] 
 55 
124. Harris K, Softeland E, Moi AL, et al. Patients' and healthcare workers' 
recommendations for a surgical patient safety checklist - a qualitative 
study. BMC health services research 2020;20(1):43. doi: 10.1186/s12913-020-
4888-1 [published Online First: 2020/01/18] 
125. Thorsteinsdottir T, Stranne J, Carlsson S, et al. LAPPRO: a prospective 
multicentre comparative study of robot-assisted laparoscopic and 
retropubic radical prostatectomy for prostate cancer. Scand J Urol Nephrol 
2011;45(2):102-12. doi: 10.3109/00365599.2010.532506 [published 
Online First: 2010/12/01] 
126. Sexton JB, Helmreich RL, Neilands TB, et al. The Safety Attitudes 
Questionnaire: psychometric properties, benchmarking data, and 
emerging research. BMC health services research 2006;6:44. doi: 
10.1186/1472-6963-6-44 [published Online First: 2006/04/06] 
127. Goras C, Wallentin FY, Nilsson U, et al. Swedish translation and 
psychometric testing of the safety attitudes questionnaire (operating 
room version). BMC health services research 2013;13:104. doi: 10.1186/1472-
6963-13-104 [published Online First: 2013/03/20] 
128. Nilsson U, Göras C, Wallentin FY, et al. The Swedish Safety Attitudes 
Questionnaire-Operating Room Version: Psychometric Properties in the 
Surgical Team. J Perianesth Nurs 2018;33(6):935-45. doi: 
10.1016/j.jopan.2017.09.009 [published Online First: 2018/11/20] 
129. Danielsen AK, Pommergaard HC, Burcharth J, et al. Translation of 
questionnaires measuring health related quality of life is not standardized: 
a literature based research study. PLoS One 2015;10(5):e0127050. doi: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0127050 [published Online First: 2015/05/13] 
130. McCambridge J, Witton J, Elbourne DR. Systematic review of the 
Hawthorne effect: New concepts are needed to study research 
participation effects. J Clin Epidemiol 2014;67(3):267-77. doi: 
10.1016/j.jclinepi.2013.08.015 
131. Guest G, Bunce A, Johnson L. How Many Interviews Are Enough?:An 
Experiment with Data Saturation and Variability. Field Methods 
2006;18(1):59-82. doi: 10.1177/1525822x05279903 
132. Hammersley M. What is qualitative research? London: London : Bloomsbury 
2013. 
133. Graneheim UH, Lundman B. Qualitative content analysis in nursing 
research: concepts, procedures and measures to achieve trustworthiness. 
Nurse Educ Today 2004;24(2):105-12. doi: 10.1016/j.nedt.2003.10.001 
134. Szumilas M. Explaining odds ratios. J Can Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry 
2010;19(3):227-29. 
135. Arora S, Tierney T, Sevdalis N, et al. The Imperial Stress Assessment Tool 
(ISAT): a feasible, reliable and valid approach to measuring stress in the 
operating room. World J Surg 2010;34(8):1756-63. doi: 10.1007/s00268-
010-0559-4 [published Online First: 2010/04/16] 
 56 
136. Miller R, Stalder T, Jarczok M, et al. The CIRCORT database: Reference 
ranges and seasonal changes in diurnal salivary cortisol derived from a 
meta-dataset comprised of 15 field studies. Psychoneuroendocrinology 
2016;73:16-23. doi: 10.1016/j.psyneuen.2016.07.201 [published Online 
First: 2016/07/28] 
137. Arora S, Sevdalis N, Aggarwal R, et al. Stress impairs psychomotor 
performance in novice laparoscopic surgeons. Surg Endosc 
2010;24(10):2588-93. doi: 10.1007/s00464-010-1013-2 
138. Erestam S, Angenete E, Derwinger K. The Surgical Teams' Perception of 
the Effects of a Routine Intraoperative Pause. World J Surg 2016 doi: 
10.1007/s00268-016-3632-9 
139. Spielberger CD, Gorsuch, R.L., & Lushene, R.E. The State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory: Testmanual. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologist Press 
1970 
140. Marteau TM, Bekker H. The development of a six-item short-form of the 
state scale of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). Br J 
Clin Psychol 1992;31 ( Pt 3):301-6. [published Online First: 1992/09/01] 
141. Julian LJ. Measures of anxiety: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI), Beck 
Anxiety Inventory (BAI), and Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale-
Anxiety (HADS-A). Arthrit Care Res 2011;63(S11):S467-S72. doi: 
10.1002/acr.20561 
142. Poolton JM, Wilson MR, Malhotra N, et al. A comparison of evaluation, time 
pressure, and multitasking as stressors of psychomotor operative 
performance. Surgery 2011;149(6):776-82. doi: 
10.1016/j.surg.2010.12.005 [published Online First: 2011/02/12] 
143. Bohnen JD, Mavros MN, Ramly EP, et al. Intraoperative Adverse Events in 
Abdominal Surgery: What Happens in the Operating Room Does Not 
Stay in the Operating Room. Ann Surg 2017;265(6):1119-25. doi: 
10.1097/sla.0000000000001906 [published Online First: 2016/11/03] 
144. O'Connor P, Reddin C, O'Sullivan M, et al. Surgical checklists: the human 
factor. Patient Saf Surg 2013;7(1):14. doi: 10.1186/1754-9493-7-14 
[published Online First: 2013/05/16] 
145. Stout RJ, Cannon-Bowers JA, Salas E, et al. Planning, Shared Mental Models, 
and Coordinated Performance: An Empirical Link Is Established. Hum 
Factors 1999;41(1):61-71. doi: 10.1518/001872099779577273 
146. Catchpole K, Mishra A, Handa A, et al. Teamwork and error in the operating 
room: analysis of skills and roles. Ann Surg 2008;247(4):699-706. doi: 
10.1097/SLA.0b013e3181642ec8 [published Online First: 2008/03/26] 
147. Makary MA, Sexton JB, Freischlag JA, et al. Operating room teamwork 
among physicians and nurses: teamwork in the eye of the beholder. J Am 
Coll Surg 2006;202(5):746-52. doi: 10.1016/j.jamcollsurg.2006.01.017 
148. Sexton JB, Makary MA, Tersigni AR, et al. Teamwork in the operating room: 
frontline perspectives among hospitals and operating room personnel. 
Anesthesiology 2006;105(5):877-84. 
 57 
149. Moulton C-a, Regehr G, Lingard L, et al. Slowing down to stay out of trouble 
in the operating room: remaining attentive in automaticity. Acad Med 
2010;85(10):1571-77. doi: 10.1097/ACM.0b013e3181f073dd 
150. Gillespie BM, Chaboyer W, Fairweather N. Interruptions and 
miscommunications in surgery: an observational study. AORN J 
2012;95(5):576-90 15p. doi: 10.1016/j.aorn.2012.02.012 
151. Weigl M, Weber J, Hallett E, et al. Associations of Intraoperative Flow 
Disruptions and Operating Room Teamwork During Robotic-assisted 
Radical Prostatectomy. Urology 2018;114:105-13. doi: 
10.1016/j.urology.2017.11.060 [published Online First: 2018/01/27] 
152. Wiegmann DA, ElBardissi AW, Dearani JA, et al. Disruptions in surgical 
flow and their relationship to surgical errors: an exploratory investigation. 
Surgery 2007;142(5):658-65. doi: 10.1016/j.surg.2007.07.034 [published 
Online First: 2007/11/06] 
153. Sevdalis N, Undre S, McDermott J, et al. Impact of intraoperative 
distractions on patient safety: a prospective descriptive study using 
validated instruments. World J Surg 2014;38(4):751-58. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00268-013-2315-z 
154. Arora S, Hull L, Sevdalis N, et al. Factors compromising safety in surgery: 
Stressful events in the operating room. Am J Surg 2010;199(1 
SUPPL.):60-65. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amjsurg.2009.07.036 
155. Catchpole KR, Giddings AE, Wilkinson M, et al. Improving patient safety 
by identifying latent failures in successful operations. Surgery 
2007;142(1):102-10. doi: 10.1016/j.surg.2007.01.033 [published Online 
First: 2007/07/17] 
156. Rosenstein AH, O'Daniel M. Impact and implications of disruptive behavior 
in the perioperative arena. J Am Coll Surg 2006;203(1):96-105. doi: 
10.1016/j.jamcollsurg.2006.03.027 [published Online First: 2006/06/27] 
 58 
APPENDIX 
1. Questionnaires regarding the intraoperative pause routine (used in study I) 
2. The Safety Attitude Questionnaire (used in study II) 
3. Items from the LAPPRO trial (used in study III) 
4. Items regarding intraoperative stress (used in study IV) 
 
 
